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of the Labor Management
Relations Act
GARY Z. NOTHSTEIN* AND JEFFREY P. AYRES**
Business rather than legal considerations dictate the initial determi-
nation to invest abroad and to operate in a particular foreign country.'
These considerations generally include market availability, transporta-
tion and communication facilities, sources of raw materials, skilled
labor, and product preferences of the target group.2 Nevertheless, legal
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar. Associate, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin &
Kahn, Washington, D.C. B.A. 1969, Johns Hopkins University; J.D. 1972, Ohio State
University; LL.M. 1973, Georgetown University.
** J.D. Candidate, George Washington University. B.A./B.S. 1974, Harvard Univer-
sity.
1. W. SURREY & C. SHAW, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
188-200 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SURREY].
2. Of course, other considerations are involved. Some of these are: (i) the need to
safeguard the parent company's export markets by penetrating foreign tariff walls; (ii) the
need to improve efficiency and responsiveness by replacing exportation with local produc-
tion in foreign markets; (iii) the need to reduce production costs; (iv) the fear that compet-
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considerations (e.g., tax and antitrust implications) guide the choice of
the particular form of business organization for the proposed foreign
investment enterprise. While the advantages of a particular form of
business organization may vary from one nation to another, Americans
most frequently invest abroad by establishing foreign subsidiaries
wholly or largely owned by American parent corporations.
3
Once a subsidiary has been established in a foreign country, it may
be, and sometimes is, used as a vehicle for the transmission of "home"
governmental policies. The home government's decision to transmit its
policies abroad is usually influenced by the desire to protect its nation-
als' business and investment interests while protecting the home govern-
ment's interest in the free flow of trade and commerce. Considerable
criticism has been directed at American efforts to protect these interests
through the exportation, or extraterritorial application,4 of domestic se-
curities and antitrust laws. This article examines the propriety under
international and domestic law of efforts to protect these same interests
through the extraterritorial application of domestic labor laws-
specifically the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.1
I
LABOR RELATIONS AND THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATION: AN OVERVIEW
In this article, the term "multinational corporation" (MNC) refers to
the foreign aspects of an American company. While this designation
does not affect the company's potential liability for domestic activities,
itors operating abroad may capture lucrative foreign markets or acquire cheaper sources
of supply, thereby threatening the parent company's domestic market position; (v) the
need to offset fluctuations in earnings by diversifying product lines; (vi) the desire to avoid
stringent home country regulations (e.g., antitrust, securities and labor laws); and (vii)
the desire to obtain lower capital and labor costs. See 1 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, THE
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: STUDIES ON U.S. FOREIGN INVESTMENT 14 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as COMMERCE].
3. See SUBCOMM. ON MULTI. CORPS. OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., DIRECT INVEST-
MENT ABROAD AND THE MULTINATIONAL: EFFECTS ON THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY, 94TH
CONG., 1ST SESS. (1975) [hereinafter cited as SUBCOMM. ON MULTI. CORPS.].
4. Extraterritorial application is the application of a domestic (American) statute to
persons or events linked with other countries as well as the United States. H. STEINER &
D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 853 (1968). The question of extraterritorial
application initially involves a determination of a court's jurisdiction to hear evidence on
the subject matter of the alleged statutory violation.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1970). For a discussion of the possible extraterritorial applica-
tion of other American labor statutes, see Goldberg, Labor Relations and Labor Standards
for Employees of United States Enterprises Working in Foreign Areas, 48 N.D.L. REV. 23
(1971).
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its effect on corporate responsibility for foreign operations raises ques-
tions that are relevant to this discussion.
The literature abounds with varying definitions of the multinational
(international, transnational) corporation or enterprise. Most of these
definitions relate to the economic or sociological aspects of the MNC
rather than to its legal aspects.' Moreover, the term "multinational
corporation" is in itself misleading, for it implies the existence of a legal
entity which does not in fact exist. Although some truly international
corporations have been founded and governed by multilateral treaties,
the term "MNC" commonly refers to entities that are not, in a legal
sense, really international corporations. Indeed, according to many
commentators, an MNC is nothing more than a group of separate legal
entities that are incorporated in, and subject to, the laws of the coun-
tries in which they operate.7 Nevertheless, practical application belies
this "definition," since certain countries attempt to regulate the foreign
operations of their MNCs.8 Although this article recognizes and at-
6. See U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190 (1973). See also INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, INTERNA-
TIONAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES OF SOCIAL Poucv FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES:
THEIR USEFULNESS AND FEASIBILITY (1976) [hereinafter cited as PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES]; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, U.S. STAKE IN WORLD TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: THE ROLE OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 11 (1972); COMMERCE, supra
note 2; Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law,
83 HAKv. L. REV. 739 (1970). The attempts of these studies to define the MNC include
the following: (i) a company whose foreign sales have reached a ratio of 25% (or some other
proportion) of its total sales; (ii) a company with global product divisions rather than an
international division; (iii) a company that attempts to carry out international activities
through a common strategy directed from a corporate center as though national bounda-
ries did not exist; (iv) a company with a certain distribution of ownership or nationality
mix of managers or directors; and (v) there is no agreed definition.
7. See PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 8 n.3; INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE,
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY (1973) [hereinafter cited as MULTI-
NATIONAL ENTERPRISES].
8. For example, the United States asserts the right to command the allegiance of its
nationals (both corporate and individual) when they venture outside the country. Host
countries oppose this position since they too claim the right to regulate these persons when
they come within their territory. See Vagts, supra note 6, at 741. Frequently the home
country (particularly the United States) cannot resist the temptation to extend its
authority to foreign subsidiaries of MNCs, thereby treating them as mere extensions of
the parent company (and of the home country). The rationalization for this practice is
that the capital exporting nation is in the best position to impose rules and regulations at
the source. At the same time, host countries have difficulty ignoring foreign control over
"their" corporations while attempting to treat them the same as local firms. Id. at 743.
See also Kronstein, The Nationality of International Enterprises, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 983,
993-98 (1952). According to Kronstein, it is ridiculous to ascribe different nationalities to
the central enterprise and its foreign establishments. Logically extended, this position
would deny that these entities have allegiances to different national laws.
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tempts to resolve the resulting dilemma, it does not attempt to set forth
the penultimate definition of the MNC. It is not necessary to do so.
For the purposes of this article, and those of any discussion concerning
the regulation of extraterritorial activity of an MNC, the essential na-
ture of an MNC lies in the fact that it locates its managerial headquar-
ters in one country (the home country), while it operates in a number
of other countries as well (the host countries).' As a working framework,
we can identify the following criteria as essential characteristics of an
MNC: (a) its identification as a group of corporate and noncorporate
entities joined together by some degree of common control; (b) the sub-
mission of different entities within the group to different national legal
systems; and (c) substantial economic activity on an international
scale.10 These characteristics of an MNC give it a supranational point
of view which may conflict, in many cases, with the social, economic,
and political concerns of individual host countries. To alleviate this
conflict, host countries may attempt to regulate the MNC's operations,
even while trying to protect the MNC's interests.
Conflicts with host countries are not the only difficulties faced by
MNCs. Special interest groups in both home and host countries have
recently forced many MNCs to respond to criticism of their foreign
operations. Labor groups have alleged that the use of the MNC as a
vehicle for foreign investment" undermines prospects for economic
growth by jeopardizing the living standards, wage rates,'" and job oppor-
9. The degree of centralized control varies among MNCs according to the predilections
of management and such factors as the type and extent of economic activity involved.
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 7, at 3.
10. Id.
11. Several studies and inquiries into the operations of MNCs have been undertaken
by committees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, by various
Executive departments and agencies, and by international organizations. See notes 2, 5,
6, & 7 supra, notes 15 & 25 infra. A recent study found that two-thirds of direct foreign
investment went to technically advanced countries, and, of the remainder, nearly one-half
went into petroleum operations. Investment in developing nations accounted for less than
20% of the total. SUBCOMM. ON MULTI. CORPS., supra note 3, at xi. The increasing scope
of MNC operations in developed countries is a recent phenomenon, and these operations
create the most difficult labor relations problems. Seham, Transnational Labor Relations:
The First Steps are Being Taken, 6 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 337, 338-39 (1974), points out
the different motivations for investing in developing, as opposed to developed, countries.
12. Although foreign wage scales are generally thought to be substantially lower than
those in the United States, this assumption can be misleading in calculating the effects
of MNCs on employment. Wage scales in industrialized countries such as the United
Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and West Germany, are rising to a level almost equal to that
of the United States. Furthermore, direct wages are not always an accurate indicator of
prevailing "wage scales." For example, it has been estimated that the cost of labor benefits
in certain countries amounts to 35% of the actual payroll. This consideration runs counter
[Vol. 10:1
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tunities of American and foreign workers alike.
In the eyes of American labor unions, the foreign operations of MNCs
significantly affect jobs.' 3 In turn, labor unions in host countries" argue
that the international nature of MNCs impairs the ability of host
country unions to engage in effective collective bargaining'5 and puts
MNCs beyond the reach of the host government's labor regulations.
to the hypothesis that MNC operations will equalize factory costs and wages in line with
the classical theory of international trade. G~inter, An Overview on Multinational Corpo-
ration and Labour, 12 INT'L INST. LABOR STUDIES BULL. 37, 41 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as An Overview]. See also INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, WAGES AND WORKING CONDI-
TIONS IN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRIsES (1976).
13. MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 7, at 28. American unions claim that
MNCs shut down domestic plants and lay off domestic workers in order to transfer this
production to foreign plants. See generally An Overview, supra note 12, at 37-46.
14. Of course, depending on their individual needs and perceptions, labor organizations
in various host countries often have different views on the problems created by MNCs.
For example, unions in industrialized nations are primarily concerned with preventing job
losses, while unions in developing nations are primarily interested in encouraging an
influx of capital to stimulate economic development and create new jobs. See
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, MULTINATIONALS IN WESTERN EUROPE: AN INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS EXPERIENCE (1975) [hereinafter cited as WESTERN EUROPE]. In nations such as
Canada, where 65% of union membership is affiliated with American international unions,
the major concern is to prevent the undermining of national sovereignty. See TARIFF
COMM'N, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT TO THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE AND ITS INTERNA'L
TRADE SUBCOMM., IMPLICATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS FOR WoRLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT
AND FOR U.S. TRADE AND LABOR 673 (Comm. print 1973) [hereinafter cited as TARIFF
COMM'N REPORT].
15. One problem with collective bargaining stems from the difficulty the host country
union has in persuading the parent company to disclose necessary financial information
directly related to host country activities of the MNC. In the United States, the em-
ployer's duty to bargain in good faith requires the disclosure, upon union request, of
sufficient information to enable the union to understand and intelligently discuss bargain-
ing issues. S.L. Allen & Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 714 (1936). Good faith bargaining may also require
the employer to divulge certain financial data to support claims presented during the
bargaining process. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956). See Seham, supra
note 11, at 342 n.18.
In the absence of similar requirements for foreign operations, host country unions are
at a significant disadvantage, since an MNC is generally required to publish information
about its finances and operations only in its home country.
16. The multinational character of an enterprise has affected the outcome of judicial
proceedings in various countries. In one case, the court upheld an MNC's notice of dis-
missal to its executive employees that was shorter than the notice usually demanded of
local companies. See Chen v. Ideal Standard (Belgium Labor Court of Nivelles, 1972). See
also PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 12. Sometimes host country governments
actually participate (whether willingly or not) in alleged MNC union busting strategies.
This is most common in less-developed countries, due to their desire to attract increased
foreign investment. For example, South Korea has prohibited strikes against subsidiaries
of foreign corporations.
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Due to the disproportionate power of the MNCs, host country labor
unions express apprehension about dealing with MNCs in labor rela-
tions matters. This apprehension is enhanced by union uncertainty as
to the power of local MNC management to make final and binding de-
cisions in bargaining or grievance sessions.'7 Furthermore, many MNCs
actively resist or withhold union recognition and attempt to apply spe-
cialized home country practices to their foreign operations, ignoring
local customs, regulations, and practices." Host country unions also
contend that, even if they overcome bargaining and recognition prob-
lems, there will be a continual threat to job security. Unlike local firms,
MNCs are able and willing to shut down or shift operations from one
plant or subsidiary to another. The unions argue that these shutdowns
and shifts are designed not only to obtain maximum profit, but also to
secure the most effective position for bargaining with workers in order
to ensure continued production during strikes or periods of other eco-
nomic action."
17. Unions feel that the relevant and important decisions are made at the MNC's home
country headquarters and are, therefore, beyond the reach of local union activity. See
Seham, supra note 11, at 341. See also Blake, International Labor and the Regulation of
Multinational Corporations: Proposals and Prospects, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 179, 181
(1973). Unions fear that home office decision-makers cannot adequately appreciate the
concerns and attitudes of foreign workers. They view MNCs as having no nationality and
no concern for working conditions in a particular country.
18. TARIFF COMM'N REPORT, supra note 14, at 683; WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 14, at
2. Home country conceptions of the nature of collective bargaining and strike action may
influence the foreign labor relations conduct of MNCs. This can be a significant irritant
to host country unions and can impair labor-management relations. For example, some
American corporations transfer home-grown convictions on union recognition and security
to their overseas operations. Thus, they often refuse to recognize unions until the Labor
Management Relations Act, with its exclusive election process, compels them to do so. In
countries where there is no legal obligation to recognize unions, as in the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands where recognition is voluntary, some MNCs have precipitated major
problems by failing to understand that custom often dictates automatic recognition.
Union recognition can also be a troublesome problem in less industrialized nations where
unionism is less established. In those areas, unions may have difficulty organizing plants
in the face of the MNC's imported conceptions about union recognition. In some cases,
American firms have recognized unions but have sought to avoid the problems of multi-
unionism, often characteristic of British bargaining, by signing closed-shop agreements
with particular unions and insisting that employees can join only these. See generally
WEsTFRN EUROPE, supra note 14, at 4-5.
19. Seham, supra note 11, at 343. These practices can be a significant factor in union-
company relations. Another factor in the balance of bargaining power is the MNC's
financial ability to withstand a strike. If production at the plant affected by the strike is
not necessary to continue operations at the parent corporation's plants in other countries,
the loss of revenue caused by the strike may be insignificant in relation to the parent
corporation's total production turnover.
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While the foregoing discussion indicates that an MNC's operations
cause severe labor relations problems, objective evidence shows that
many of these complaints are unwarranted.
First, although most home country labor organizations have reacted
to the outflow of domestic capital and technology by pressing for restric-
tive legislation to protect domestic employment, studies released by the
United States International Trade Commission and the Department of
Commerce reveal that direct foreign investment results in no loss of
domestic jobs."0 Instead, these studies indicate that foreign investment
through MNCs actually stimulates both domestic employment and
domestic economic activity." In addition, the American economy con-
tinually benefits from the export of American goods and services bound
for use in MNC operations abroad. Furthermore, despite the rapid
growth of overseas investment, goods which embody low-wage foreign
labor are traditionally imported to the United States in small numbers. 2
Thus, it appears as though slowing economic growth and the concomi-
tant rise of unemployment have led unions to strike out at MNCs in an
attempt to find a scapegoat for these economic woes.?
20. See generally COMMERCE, supra note 2; TARIFF COMM'N REPORT, supra note 14. Sec-
tion 283 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2102-2487 (1975), requires firms moving
production facilities outside the United States to offer employment opportunities to em-
ployees who lose their jobs as a result of the move and to assist those employees in
relocation. Moreover, the firm must notify concerned employees at least 60 days before
the move.
21. COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 28; TARIFF COMM'N REPORT, supra note 14, at 651-72. In
the past when imports into the home country were low or of a noncompeting nature or
were balanced with exports, the possible impact of MNC operations on home country
employment attracted little attention, for they were regarded as normal trade effects. Now
however, trade unions have come to regard MNC operations abroad as a primary cause
of home country job losses. Unions feel that foreign expansion reduces domestic employ-
ment in two ways: (i) by increasing home country reliance on imported goods; and (ii) by
increasing foreign market reliance on goods made by subsidiaries located abroad rather
than by plants in the home country. It is not clear whether MNC operations abroad cause
an overall net loss of employment opportunities in the home country, but job losses in the
United States have generally affected the low skilled sector. Direct investment abroad
almost inevitably affects host country employment, since the subsidiary offers employ-
ment to host country nationals, but the extent of this impact varies widely with such
factors as the level of industrialization in the host country.
22. COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 21.
23. Most commentators treat foreign investment and domestic employment as func-
tions of disparate factors and deny that American foreign investors are exporting Ameri-
can jobs. It is by no means certain that domestic employment rises and falls as overseas
investment expands or contracts. Instead, domestic employment is more directly related,
both in theory and in practice, to the general state of the American economy. When the
domestic economy operates at full employment levels, labor shows little interest in foreign
investment.
1976]
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Second, although labor relations practices vary among different
MNCs and depend largely upon the particular host country involved,
certain nearly uniform conclusions can be made. Generally, decision-
making power is decentralized. This is particularly true in the case of
issues related to collective bargaining, since the crucial policies and
techniques are closely related to the legal, economic, and social environ-
ment of the MNC's place of operation." While the practice may vary,
MNCs generally assign only major investment decisions (e.g., expan-
sion or contraction) for determination by the home office.2 Neverthe-
less, due to the nature of collective bargaining, the place where a deci-
sion is made may be of little importance. Business interests, such as
productivity and profit considerations, will dictate the same response to
the labor union regardless of where that response originates.,
Third, objective evidence also indicates that the MNC's ability to
transfer production does not seriously weaken the bargaining position of
host country labor unions; nor does this factor appear to reduce the
effectiveness of anticipated strike action.2
24. The available evidence tends to support the view that, at least in Western Europe,
industrial relations matters are handled by the subsidiary management. An Overview,
supra note 12. See also MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 7, at 93, stating that many
MNCs have no company-wide labor relations policies and give autonomy in this area to
their subsidiaries.
25. WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 14, at 15.
26. While the spreading of production facilities throughout different countries is often
perceived as a threat to national union power, this extension of facilities can make a
company more vulnerable than a purely national competitor. In the case of a highly
integrated corporation with specialized functions in different countries, a strike in any
plant could have an impact on the company's worldwide operations. See, e.g., Time, June
14, 1976, at 54, discussing the recently proposed worldwide boycott of the United Rubber-
workers Union against the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company. Of course, MNCs are likely
to become involved with their subsidiaries more often in cases of strike or boycott action
than in other phases of labor relations. Marketing considerations may influence the policy
of MNCs toward their overseas subsidiaries. If, for example, a particular subsidiary ships
an important part of its output abroad, the home office is likely to be more concerned
about a strike than it would be if the plant supplied only a local market. See generally
WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 14, at 24-29.
27. When considering the transfer of production, a MNC will certainly take into ac-
count not only labor relations and labor costs in the new location, but also such factors
as the degree of inflation in that country, its political stability, the possibility of capital
repatriation, tariff regulations, and the threat of government intervention. According to
most commentators, obstacles to the transfer of production are usually insurmountable.
See MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 7, at 90; Industrial Relations in a Multina-
tional Framework, 107 INT'L LAB. REv. 489, 496 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Industrial
Relations]. The MNC fear is that it will be caught in a gigantic whipsaw strike in which
its worldwide work force will attempt to get the best holiday in one country, the best
vacations in another, the best pensions in another, and so on. Nevertheless, MNCs dis-
The Labor Management Relations Act
Nevertheless, there may be some merit to the contention that MNCs
frequently fail to conform to host country regulations and practices by
trying to transfer personnel and labor relations practices from their
home country.2 Many MNCs respect and adapt to host country labor
relations practices and policies, and are even occasionally compelled to
conform.2 9 At the same time, MNCs often implement the most impor-
tant of their home country practices. Their styles of labor management
often show distinct home country influence, and on some matters they
operate under direct home country control."
At least two factors compel this continued export of home country
labor relations practices. First, few host countries have a comprehensive
set of labor relations regulations. If MNCs failed to apply their home
country policies, many labor-management dealings would be uncon-
trolled.' Second, host country labor unions have recently intensified
their efforts to organize transnational economic cooperation among un-
ions, including bargaining with MNCs.2 This raises great practical and
claim the power to shift production resources as a bargaining tool and argue that their
commitment to capital resources and materials is too substantial to permit some assembly
lines to be turned off while others are speeded up like spigots. Whatever the MNC's
capacity to effect international transfers of funds and currencies, the same flexibility does
not exist in dealing with production capacity itself. MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra
note 7, at 90; Seham, supra note 11, at 345.
28. MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 7, at 92; Industrial Relations, supra note
27, at 498.
29. Many of the host country policies adopted by MNCs actually relate to terms and
conditions of employment (e.g., nondiscrimination, minimum wages, working hours,
safety and health standards), rather than to labor relations. See generally PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 13-14. In those matters, there is no difference between MNCs
and other enterprises. Id. at 13.
30. WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 14, at 3-9, 35-37. See notes 17-18 supra and accompa-
nying text.
31. See generally WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 14, at 27. For example, much of the
substance and structure of labor-management relations is prescribed by law in the Federal
Republic of Germany. This inevitably assures greater conformity by MNCs to national
practices than in voluntaristic systems such as that of the United Kingdom, where MNCs
are more likely to introduce home country practices.
32. Id. at 65-69. See also Seham, supra note 11, at 347-57. At one time or another, most
host country unions have called upon home country unions to intervene on their behalf
in disputes with subsidiaries of MNCs. Some unions have, in fact, placed pressure upon
management on behalf of workers in a foreign subsidiary of the MNC. This type of action,
or similar action by groups of unions dealing with the same company in different coun-
tries, is often coordinated by one of the international trade union secretariats. It seems
to be the most widespread and readily available form of international cooperation by
unions dealing with the same MNC. In spite of this demonstrated solidarity, some obsta-
cles have been encountered. These obstacles, which unions are seeking to eliminate, vary
from country to country depending on legal limitations on the right to strike, the right to
1976]
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legal problems for MNCs. It would be impractical to respond to this
cooperative action by relying on the diverse labor relations laws of those
host countries that have passed relevant legislation. If this practice were
followed, unions could profit by taking action only in favorably regu-
lated or unregulated countries. From the MNC's standpoint, the best
response to this action would be to apply the home country's domestic
labor laws.
33
The extraterritorial application of home country labor laws raises two
questions. The first involves the scope of application; i.e., whether home
country laws should be applied to all aspects of the MNC's labor rela-
refuse overtime work, and the right to refuse to work on "struck" production on behalf of
workers in another country. In view of these obstacles and the rather limited development
of transnational union-management relations, it is not surprising that there has been only
a limited amount of such sympathetic supportive action. It appears as though action of
this type will have limited effect until coordinated transnational bargaining with MNCs
has developed to a greater extent. See id. at 358. Among the barriers to this development
are: the relatively good wages and working conditions in most multinational subsidiaries;
the existence of plural unionism and plural international union affiliations in many coun-
tries; the nature of bargaining structures in the MNC's own countries; legal obstacles to
transnational union action; the great cost of bringing trade unionists together, even for
preliminary meetings to plan strategy and tactics; and language barriers. WESTERN
EUROPE, supra note 14, at 42-48. Nevertheless, transnational negotiations with MNCs
(such as Ford, Philips, and Nestle) are increasing, and union coordination in these nego-
tiations often equals that of the management of MNCs. An Overview, supra note 12, at
44. In the North American automobile industry, collective bargaining agreements have
been reached between an American corporation and its Canadian subsidiary, on one side,
and an international union established in the United States on behalf of unions in each
country, on the other. See PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 15. One device to
hasten multinational collective bargaining is the use of common expiration dates in
agreements. Fairweather, European Labor Relations and the American Corporate
Management, in PRIVATE INvESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 99, 105 (1972). For
a discussion of the U.S. labor movement's resistance to the concept of international labor
solidarity, see TARIFF COMM'N REPORT, supra note 14, at 686.
33. Increasing demands have been made for public governmental control of MNC labor
relations activities on an international basis. Among the suggestions are the drafting of
model contracts for foreign operations and the adoption of an International Code of Con-
duct to be administered by an international agency under the direction of the Interna-
tional Labor Organization. An Overview, supra note 12, at 39. The International Labor
Organization recently decided that international rules for collective bargaining may be
appropriate. See MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 7. Many international trade
unions have also called for a United Nations conference to lay down a code of conduct
for multinational corporations. See Industrial Relations, supra note 27, at 491. The Inter-
national Metal Workers Federation has adopted a resolution which envisages a number
of measures, including international company laws, to regulate the operation and activi-
ties of corporations that operate across national frontiers. This resolution urges the
International Labor Organization to establish and publish a black list of MNCs found to
be violating the provisions of international company laws relating to the concerns of
workers. Id. at 493.
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tions (including recognition of unions, arbitration, and collective bar-
gaining) or only to union economic action such as strikes and boycotts. 4
The second question stems from the fact that the home country's labor
laws may have never before been applied in a transnational setting and
from the possibility that such an application may interfere with the
sovereignty of host states to which the MNC subsidiary owes allegiance.
Thus, the major question is whether the extraterritorial application of
domestic labor laws is practical and consistent with both international
law and the domestic law of the particular home country.
This discussion of the proposed application of the Labor Management
Relations Act to the extraterritorial activities of MNCs may be novel,
but the MNC itself is a novel institution. It is an institution with trans-
national decisional power, strategic orientation, and functional require-
ments that have no counterpart at the national level. 5 As a home coun-
try, the United States may be forced to exercise labor jurisdiction over
its entire group of multinationals in order to control the institution. The
same course of action may also be necessary to prevent the diversity of
host country labor laws from impairing the MNC's effectiveness as a
vehicle for investment abroad.
II
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS AFFECTING THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
International law is a system of principles, 6 derived largely from ac-
cepted practice, which sets forth the standard of conduct for states and
other entities subject to its tenets. The content of international law
varies with time, as nations engage in an interest balancing process to
34. Practical problems associated with the extraterritorial application of labor relations
laws are discussed in Part IV. A related problem is whether international law allows these
laws to be applied to all employees of the MNC, only to foreign workers, or only to home
country employees who have been brought into the host country by the MNC. This
problem is discussed in Part II.
35. PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 9.
36. Although readily distinguishable in many respects from domestic law, this system
has definite characteristics, some of which are common to domestic law. See W. BISHOP,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 11 (3d ed. 1971).
37. 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1940). Since individuals and
organizations may be governed directly by international law, it may be more precise to
define international law in terms of the manner in which it is created. Thus, international
law can be described as a system of governing principles created by the acts of two or more
states-whether through convention or custom. See H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 201 (1952).
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adhere to certain practices and discard others. 38 When certain practices
are adopted, they attain the stature of accepted principles or norms and
are considered binding upon those entities subject to international law.
There are several sources for these norms.39
A. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Customary international law consists of those practices which have
acquired the force of law due to their acceptance as such by the
international community." A state which presses a claim on the basis
of custom must demonstrate that the custom is generally regarded as
binding. In any given case, this assessment cannot be made without
considering the growing disagreement over which principles of state
38. See 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1963).
39. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which enumerates
the sources of international law, provides:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
I.C.J. STAT. art. 38, para. 1 (1945). To the best of our knowledge, the sources of interna-
tional law set forth in paragraphs (c) and (d) contain no rules either permitting or
prohibiting the extraterritorial application of domestic law. They will, therefore, be given
no further consideration in this article. Nevertheless, they may be important insofar as
they lend flexibility to published international law and completeness of both custom and
convention.
40. To establish the existence of a rule of customary international law, a state must
demonstrate the following elements: (a) concordant practice by a number of states with
regard to a type of situation within the domain of international relations; (b) continuation
or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of time; (c) demonstrated concep-
tion that the practice is required by, or consistent with, prevailing international law; and
(d) general acquiescence in the practice by other states. Hudson, Article 24 of the Statute
of the International Law Commission, [1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 26, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/16 (1950). See generally 1 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 38, at 75. Since customary
international law originates with the consent of states, many commentators argue that no
state is obligated by a rule of customary international law unless it has consented to that
rule. Many supporters of this position also contend that new states are not bound by
customary rules established before they became states. But cf. H. KELSEN, supra note 37,
at 148-55, which contends that states can be bound by general international law without
their consent and even against their will. For example, this position would hold a new state
to all obligations of general international law, even though that state has not recognized
each obligation.
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responsibility enjoy continuing validity in the contemporary world. Due
to this disagreement, nations involved in a dispute are likely to have




Standards prescribed by customary international law cannot be
considered in a vacuum, however, for every state has certain "funda-
mental rights" which originate in neither custom nor agreement but in
the very nature of the nation-state. These fundamental rights are the
ultimate basis of positive international law and, therefore, have greater
force than rules created by custom or agreement.2 One of the most
basic of these rights is the right of a state to exercise jurisdiction over
all persons, property, and conduct within its territory. 3
Nevertheless, the right of a state to exercise jurisdiction is not unre-
stricted. 4 Since the goals of international law are based upon reciproc-
ity, certain correlative restrictions and duties have been recognized as
rules of customary law. These include: (i) the duty to refrain from per-
forming acts of sovereignty within the territory of another state; and (ii)
the duty to refrain from interfering with the exercise of another state's
jurisdiction.
Upon first consideration, these restrictions seem to indicate that no
state may ever exercise its jurisdiction extraterritorially, unless a per-
missive rule of international law specifically provides otherwise. Never-
theless, international law contains no general prohibition on the extra-
territorial exercise of jurisdiction. Therefore, even in the absence of a
permissive rule, a state is not automatically prohibited from exercising
its jurisdiction within the territory of another state." The only limita-
41. SURREY, supra note 1. A state's position with respect to customary international law
is often illustrated by its municipal court decisions (which are themselves a subsidiary
source of international law). For example, in The Paquette Habana, The Lola, 175 U.S.
677 (1900), the Supreme Court recognized that customary international law does indeed
bind the United States. Id. at 700; accord, Interhandel Case, [1959] I.C.J. 28: "The
decisions of the United States courts bear witness to the fact that [they] are competent
to apply international law in their decisions when necessary .... See also Ware v. Hyl-
ton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 228 (1796); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 161 (1795).
42. SURREY, supra note 1.
43. This fundamental right was recognized in the case of Schooner Exchange v. McFad-
den, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812), where the court stated that a nation's jurisdiction
within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute and is susceptible of no
limitation not imposed by itself. See also D. GRIEG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 164 (1970).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 6
(1972) uses jurisdiction to signify a state's capacity, under international law, to prescribe
or enforce a rule of law.
45. A permissive rule does exist. The classic Case of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., ser. A,
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tion is that the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction must not conflict
with a correlative restriction or duty of customary international law.
Thus, no custom binds a state to defer to the exclusive jurisdiction of
another simply because the act in question took place within the borders
of the other nation.
A related aspect of this question is the right of a state to apply its laws
to conduct of its own nationals occurring within the territory of another
state. Such an exercise of jurisdiction raises few, if any, international
legal complications, except in those rare cases when a treaty provides
otherwise." As the United States Supreme Court said in Blackmer v.
United States," a state's authority to regulate the extraterritorial con-
duct of its nationals involves no question of an international legal viola-
tion, but solely a question of the purport of the municipal law that
establishes the duties of citizens in relation to their government. 8 Thus,
under existing international practice, a state is assumed to have practi-
cally unlimited legal control over its nationals. This competence can be
justified on the basis of comity"9 and because a state's treatment of its
own nationals is not ordinarily a matter of concern to other states or to
international law.
In Skiriotes v. Florida,5" the Supreme Court stated that "the United
States is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing
the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign
countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not
infringed."'" Thus, as long as the United States maintains respect for
No. 10 (1927), [1927-1928] Ann. Dig. 153 (No. 98), 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 8 (1928), is generally
cited for the proposition that international law allows a state to apply its laws
extraterritorially in the case of an act which has direct effects within the borders of that
state. For a municipal decision on this point, see United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274
U.S. 268, 276 (1927). In the absence of specific treaty obligations, prohibitions of interna-
tional law are neither easy to identify nor lightly to be presumed.
46. Bisuop, supra note 36, at 531.
47. 284 U.S. 421 (1931).
48. Id. at 439. See also HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 56-57 (8th ed. 1924). A country's laws
travel with its nationals wherever they go, both in places within and without the jurisdic-
tion of other powers.
49. Comity has been defined as "the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws." See The Janko (Norsktant), 54
F. Supp. 241, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1944), citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
50. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
51. Id. at 73-74, 77. See also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952). The rule
of law first set down in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d
Cir. 1945), enlarged the jurisdictional powers of the United States by holding that: "[Ilt
is settled law ...that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within
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the personality, sovereignty, and independence of foreign states, there
seems to be no international restriction preventing it from applying the
Labor Management Relations Act to govern the extraterritorial conduct
of its nationals. Furthermore, comity would seem to require host coun-
tries to recognize American application of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, provided that application does not endanger the rights of its
own citizens or those of other persons under the protection of its laws.
B. CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW (TREATIES)
Conventions give positive expression to agreements among states and,
as such, bind only the contracting parties and cease to bind them when
they cease to be contracting parties.2 Conventions may refer to, recog-
its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders
which the state reprehends." The Alcoa decision led to the adoption of § 18 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965), which
states that:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory,
if. . .(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which
the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as
a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the
rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states
that have reasonably developed legal systems.
The Restatement rule raises the possibility of conflict, as in a case where the jurisdiction
of the territorial state is not exclusive and another state applies its rules to the situation.
A classic example of this situation is the case of British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial
Chemical Industries, Ltd. [1955] 37 Ch. In that case, the decree of the American court
required action by ICI, which the British courts then prohibited. The case of United States
v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), in
which the Swiss government strongly protested the application of an American decree,
posed another such situation. The application of national law to the conduct of foreign
nationals outside the United States could create many conflicts. We feel that there would
be a serious problem, under international law, with an attempt to justify an assertion of
home country jurisdiction over host country nationals solely on the ground that their
actions have consequences within the United States. Such an assertion could, in effect,
seek to apply American law to a French citizen who has done an act in France. Even
ignoring international law, this sort of attempt to govern the conduct of French citizens
in France infringes the rights of both France and its nationals. It is our conclusion that
there must be retrenchment from the jurisdictional doctrine espoused in Alcoa. Interna-
tional law precludes the extraterritorial application of the Labor Management Relations
Act to foreign nationals abroad-even if (contrary to Alcoa) their conduct outside Ameri-
can borders has consequences within American borders which America reprehends. See
Raymond, A New Look at the Jurisdiction in ALCOA, 61 AM. INT'L L. J. 558 (1967).
52. See J. BRiERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 68-69 (3d ed. 1942). The Vienna Treaty on
Treaties makes the law governing treaties into treaty law. Article 2-1A of that Treaty
provides that a treaty is an international agreement concluded between states in written
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in one or more instruments.
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nize, adopt, modify, or contradict rules of customary international law. 3
International law, through the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, requires
contracting parties to carry out their treaty obligations, but those obli-
gations are not themselves the law. According to the United States
Constitution, treaties are the law of the land and, therefore, have the
same status as domestic law. 4
In the absence of conflict with domestic law-in which case the later
in time prevails5 -international law as embodied in conventions or
treaties may form the basis for a decision on the legality of the extrater-
ritorial application of domestic law. The United States has ratified sev-
eral treaties that may affect the extraterritorial application of the Labor
Management Relations Act. 6
1. Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
Bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation ("FNC
treaties") are perhaps the most familiar instruments of diplomacy.
While the precise content and treatment of these instruments have
varied with the needs of time, the usages of the countries involved, and
the foreign policy objectives in issue, in United States practice such
instruments have evolved into a comprehensive charter of relations in
the domain of private affairs.5" Essentially these treaties define the
treatment each contracting party owes to the nationals, companies and
products (hereinafter "nationals") of the other; their rights to engage
in business and other activities within the boundaries of the host coun-
try; and the respect due these nationals, their property and their enter-
prises.
FCN treaties typically contain two principal standards which define
the commitments each contracting party has assumed with respect to
treatment and regulation of nationals of the other party: the most fa-
The parties to the treaty must intend it to create binding obligations for the terms of the
Vienna Treaty to apply.
53. See G. HACKWORTH, supra note 37, at 17.
54. U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2.
55. Although the "later in time" rule may render a treaty ineffective within the United
States, an international tribunal would disregard this rule and enforce the treaty. 1 M.
WHITEMAN, supra note 38, at 104.
56. The Labor Management Relations Act was adopted in 1947. If it isinterpreted to
be susceptible to extraterritorial application, any inconsistent treaty obligation would
have to be later in time to prevail.
57. These treaties are not political in character; rather they are fundamentally eco-
nomic and legal. Although commerce and navigation complete their title, today such
treaties are typically ones of establishment, concerned with the protection of persons,
natural and juristic, and of the property and interests of such persons.
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vored nation clause and the national treatment clause." While the for-
mer assures nondiscrimination as compared with other aliens or alien
things, the latter assures nondiscrimination as compared with citizens
of the host country and national things.59 Usually these standards focus
on the business and occupation rights of nationals, particularly as they
may affect the host country's labor markets and trades.
The contracting parties to FCN treaties may agree that the labor
standards and relations laws of either the host country or the home
country will be applicable to the nationals of the other when such na-
tionals are employed in the host country. However, while application of
labor standards legislation has been a topic in FCN treaties,"0 none of
the FCN treaties in effect dictates the application of the labor relations
laws of either host or home country under such circumstances. Never-
theless, certain provisions of FCN treaties may be interpreted as permit-
ting the extraterritorial application of the home country's labor relations
laws. For example, with respect to hiring skilled personnel from abroad,
FCN treaties typically give the MNC the right to hire "accountants and
other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, and agents and
other specialists of its choice." 6' The hiring of such persons is presuma-
bly subject only to the local immigration, labor standards and alien
employment laws of the host country. Furthermore, each of the FCN
treaties contains a general provision stating that nothing in the treaty
shall preclude the application of home country regulations which are
necessary to fulfill the obligations of the home country for the mainte-
nance or restoration of international peace and security, or which are
necessary to protect its essential interests. Conceivably, essential inter-
ests might be construed to include internal or economic security. So
construed, this escape clause would open the door to the extraterritorial
58. These are "contingent" standards which are, as the name implies, ones that define
in relative terms the treatment to be provided. At any given time, the specific nature of
the treatment is determined not merely from a reading of the treaty itself, but also by
reference to an exterior state of the law and fact. The objective is to secure nondiscrimi-
nation or equality of treatment.
59. Several provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between
the United States of America and Japan, April 2, 1953, [1953] 2 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S.
No. 2863, reflect this principle of equal protection. For example, Article 5 states that
"[nleither party shall take unreasonable or discriminatory measures that would impair
the legally acquired rights or interests within its territories of nationals and companies of
the other Party in the enterprises which they have established." Article 7 of the same
treaty states that nationals and companies shall be permitted to establish and maintain
branches, to organize companies (subsidiaries), and to control and manage domestic
enterprises which they have established or acquired within the territory of the other party.
60. See, e.g., id., respecting workmen's compensation and social security.
61. See, e.g., id., Art. 8.
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application of home country regulations, such as its labor relations laws,
if such regulations are arguably necessary to protect its economic inter-
ests.
12
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") is a multilat-
eral treaty to which the major governments of the world, together ac-
counting for more than four-fifths of world trade, subscribe.,3 While
creating a code of conduct for the contracting parties, the GATT also
provides a forum under which such parties can discuss their trade prob-
lems and negotiate to enlarge world trading opportunities."4
Despite the complexity of the GATT, its essence can be stated in four
fundamental principles: nondiscrimination, trade liberalization, con-
sultation, and tariff negotiations. Of these, only the first, nondiscrimi-
nation, is relevant to our discussion. As in FCN treaties, the GATT
nondiscrimination principle is predicated on two basic concepts: most
favored nation treatment and national treatment.
Article 3 of the GATT, which deals with national treatment, is the
only provision which arguably restricts the extraterritorial application
of a contracting party's domestic legislation. 5 However, Article 3 only
affects the application of a contracting party's laws and regulations as
they pertain to its products. It does not apply to the regulation of the
commodity of labor which produces those products. Furthermore, Arti-
cle 20 of the GATT (general exceptions) states that,
62. See STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 4, at 1326.
63. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. See
generally, J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw. OF GATT (1969); TRENDS IN UNITED
STATES MERCHANDISE TRADE, GATT STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE No. 3 (JULY, 1972);
EXECUTIVE BRANCH GATT STUDIES, COMPILATION OF 1973 STUDIES PREPARED BY THE EXECU-
TiVE BRANCH, for the SUBCOMM. ON INT'L TRADE OF SENATE COMM. ON FIN., 93RD CONG.,
2D SESs. (1974). GATT is the only multinational convention that lays down agreed rules
for international trade and whose reciprocal rights and obligations apply to most trading
nations. For the past 30 years, GAIT has also functioned as the principle international
body concerned with negotiating the reduction of trade and non-trade barriers and with
international trade relations.
64. For the purposes of this article we shall assume that the United States has validly
entered the GATT and is bound by its provisions as in any treaty. See Jackson, The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv.
249 (1967).
65. Article 3 of Part 2 of the GATT states that the contracting parties recognize that
internal taxes and other charges, and the laws and regulations affecting the sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products in specified amounts or
proportions shall not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protec-
tion to domestic production.
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subject to the requirements that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or
a disguised restriction of international trade, nothing in [the GATI]
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations (of that contracting party) which are not inconsistent with
the provisions of the GATT.
Thus, by its own terms the GATT would not restrict the extraterritorial
application of the Labor Management Relations Act.
3. The International Labor Organization
Established by international agreement, the International Labor
Organization ("ILO") is an organization through which member coun-
tries adopt and enforce international labor standards legislation.6 Com-
posed of conventions and recommendations, 7 this legislation is system-
atically arranged to comprise the International Labor Code. In no case
may the adoption of any such legislation by any member country be
deemed to affect any domestic or municipal law of that country which
assures more favorable conditions to the workers concerned than those
provided for in the convention or recommendation.1
8
While the value of the International Labor Code cannot be fully
gauged, its worth lies in the impact which its standards have had, or are
likely to have, on the working and living conditions of laborers in the
member countries. At best, the effect of the International Labor Code
has only been to secure from member countries a pledge to maintain
their national law and practice in full conformity with the conventions
of the International Labor Code as long as these conventions remain in
force with the ratifying country. 9
66. Constitution of the International Labor Organization, as amended Oct. 9, 1946, 62
Stat. 1151, 15 U.N.T.S. 35. Membership in the ILO compares favorably with that of the
GATT.
67. Article 19 of the Constitution of the ILO sets forth two separate procedures and
instruments for adopting international labor legislation; the convention and the recom-
mendation. A convention is an instrument which not only sets standards of achievement
but which when ratified creates binding international obligations for the country con-
cerned. The recommendation creates no such obligation, but is essentially a guide to
national action. The procedures for ratification or adoption of conventions and recommen-
dations are set forth in Article 19, Sections 5 and 6 of the ILO Constitution.
68. Article 19, Section 8 of the ILO Constitution.
69. Every convention, however, includes a standard clause permitting the ratifying
country to denounce it once a period of ten to thirty years has passed since its original
entry into force.
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Of course, the extent to which ILO standards have had a positive
influence on the national laws and practices of member countries de-
pends in large part on the countries' economic and constitutional
structures, on the degree and the timing of their social development, and
on several other related factors. Because ILO conventions and recom-
mendations essentially contain minimum provisions intended to serve
as a common denominator for the circumstances prevailing in many
different countries, and since conformity of law and practice to these
ILO standards may involve a raising of national levels of labor protec-
tion to meet international norms, the potential impact of ILO standards
is greater in countries in an early stage of economic and social advance-
ment than in those countries in a more highly industrialized stage of
advancement.
In a practical sense, the international labor standards legislation of
the International Labor Code regulates only conditions of labor and not
labor relations. Thus, with respect to labor conditions, MNCs of mem-
ber countries of the ILO would be required, pursuant to "international
law," to comply with the International Labor Code or with general na-
tional laws maintained in conformity with the Code in every country of
their operation-there would be no distinction between MNCs and local
firms in this respect. 0 Therefore, MNCs could not import and institute
home country practices or regulations with respect to labor conditions
if such conditions were less favorable than those provided in the Interna-
tional Labor Code. However, with respect to labor relations, the existing
international labor standards leave room for a diversity of national solu-
tions and neither provide nor require restriction, regulation or guidance.
Not surprisingly, there is no provision in the International Labor Code
which restricts a member country from applying its labor relations law
extraterritorially to its nationals located.in another country.7'
70. The standards adopted and contained in the International Labor Code which relate
to conditions of work and of employment include: an eight hour day, a forty-eight hour
workweek; minimum wages; minimum age; employment of women; night work by women;
unemployment; workmen's compensation; occupational diseases and sickness; industrial
safety; non-discrimination; hours of work; holidays with pay; weekly wages, social secu-
rity; and protection of freedom of association.
71. The ILO has, however, made initial attempts to discuss the question of the useful-
ness of establishing both international labor relations regulations and international prin-
ciples and guidelines for MNCs. See note 33 supra; PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra note
6, at 4. See also MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 7, at 107-58. Most participants
at a meeting on the "Relationship between Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,"
while of the opinion that further study on the subject was advisable, felt that governments
of home countries should regulate and supervise the activities of their MNCs. See gener-
ally Landy, The Influence of International Labor Standards: Possibilities and
Performance, 101 INT'L LAB. REV. 555 (1970); Seham, supra note 11, at 366.
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It therefore appears that no rule or principle of international law,
either customary or conventional, restricts or proscribes the extraterrito-
rial application of the Labor Management Relations Act to American
employees of an MNC.
III
DOMESTIC LAW ASPECTS AFFECTING THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
A. EXERCISE OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD JURISDICTION
While the previous discussion has demonstrated that international
law does not operate as a constraint on the extraterritorial application
of the Labor Management Relations Act to American employees work-
ing on foreign soil for American MNCs,72 the National Labor Relations
Board (the "Board") has never applied the Act, either through recog-
nition or unfair labor practice proceedings, to American employees
under such circumstances. 3 Furthermore, only one reported decision,
72. Hence, we need not discuss the related considerations suggested by the maxim
under which a court, after determining that Congress clearly intended a statute to have
extraterritorial application, is bound to follow the statute even if accepted principles of
international law would be thereby transgressed. See, e.g., Rainey v. United States, 232
U.S. 310, 316 (1914); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334
(2d Cir. 1972). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 3 (1965). Of course, even given such clear congressional intent, extraterri-
torial application would still be constrained by the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Jones, An Interest Analysis Approach to the Extraterritorial Application of Rule
lOb-5, 52 TEx. L. REv. 983, 992 n.40 and accompanying text (1974). Furthermore, assum-
ing that an American court decided to apply extraterritorially a domestic statute which
contravenes international law, a foreign court would not necessarily enforce any orders
issued by the American court pursuant to that statute. See Griffin, The Power of Host
Countries Over the Multinational: Lifting the Veil in the European Economic Community
and the United States, 6 L. & POL'Y INT. Bus. 375, 420-27 (1974).
73. The Board can and has asserted jurisdiction over the American employees of foreign
corporations, and the foreign employees of both American and foreign corporations, where
the work was performed within the United States. For cases in which the Board asserted
jurisdiction over aliens working within the United States, see, e.g., NLRB v. Scott Paper
Co., 440 F.2d 625 (1st Cir. 1971); C.P. Clare & Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 589 (1971); Great
Northern Paper Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 824 (1968). Furthermore, employees of American
transportation companies with an American terminus have been held to be covered by the
Labor Management Relations Act, even though foreign travel was involved. Freeport
Transport, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. No. 125 (1975); Grace Line, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 775 (1962).
Cf. e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), in which the
Supreme Court held that the Board did not have jurisdiction over foreign sailors on
foreign-flag ships owned by American corporations which operated between foreign and
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RCA OMS, has even attempted to address the issue.74 In this case, a
union sought to represent the American employees of an American
MNC at five Distant Early Warning (DEW line) sites located in Green-
land. Even though the employees were required to have a United States
security clearance, were hired in and paid from the United States, and
returned to the United States upon completion of their jobs, the Board
refused to order an election on the ground that Greenland did not come
within the jurisdiction of the Act. The Supreme Court decision in Benz
v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo"5 was the sole authority cited by the
Board in support of its holding."
American ports; Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 13 N.L.R.B. 28 (1939), where the Board
held that it had no jurisdiction over the foreign operations of a Canadian bus company
which had about 10% of its operations within the United States; and Detroit & Canada
Tunnel Corp., 83 N.L.R.B. 727 (1949), where the Board, without addressing the issue of
jurisdiction, excluded Canadian employees working in Canada for an American employer
from a unit consisting of the employees who worked in the United States for that em-
ployer. Additionally, the Board has asserted jurisdiction over foreign companies doing
business in the United States, even when some of the employees have been foreigners. See,
e.g., Italia Societa per Azione di Navigazione, 118 N.L.R.B. 1113 (1957); Delta Match
Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1400 (1953); The Royal Bank of Canada, 67 N.L.R.B. 403 (1946). But
see AGIP, USA, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1972); Herbert Harvey, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 238
(1968); British Rail-Int'l, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. 721 (1967); Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
13 N.L.R.B. 28 (1939). In these cases the Board declined to assert jurisdiction without ever
reaching the question whether the Board in fact had jurisdiction, because of the em-
ployer's close relationship with a foreign government. Based on these cases, especially the
more recent rulings, an administrative law judge recently decided that the Board should
not rule on a petition for an election at the State Bank of India's Chicago branch for
although those rulings indicate the Board has discretion to assert jurisdiction, its policy
is not to do so. The Board, however, scheduled oral argument in mid-February, 1977, on
the question of whether it should assert jurisdiction over companies that are owned and
operated by foreign governments, but do business in the United States and employ Ameri-
can citizens. State Bank of India, Case No. 13-RC-14061, July 15, 1976.
74. RCA OMS, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 228 (1973). But see Currie, Flags of Convenience,
American Labor, and the Conflict of Laws, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 34, 79 n.179 (1963), referring
to a release dated March 2, 1962, in which the General Counsel dismissed charges filed
by American workers against an American company for alleged unfair labor practices with
respect to the company's engineering services in Pakistan. The reference in the Currie
article, however, does not indicate whether the workers employed in Pakistan were
Americans or foreigners. Cf. Bell & Howell Airline Serv. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 67 (1970),
where the Board excluded all persons working exclusively in a foreign country, regardless
of nationality, from a unit of American based employees. The issue of jurisdiction, how-
ever, was not discussed.
75. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
76. 202 N.L.R.B. 228 (1973). It is important to note that the decision in the RCA OMS
case was predicated upon the Board's finding that it had no jurisdiction, rather than upon
the Board's declining to assert jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has long recognized that
"the Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor Relations
Act so singlemindedly that it may ignore other and equally important Congressional
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In Benz, a foreign shipowner brought a common-law tort action for
damages caused by an American union's peaceful picketing of a foreign-
flag ship, while the ship was temporarily in an American port, in fur-
therance of a strike by the foreign crew. The Court held the picketing
was not arguably regulated by the Labor Management Relations Act
since the Board did not have jurisdiction over the shipowner and its
crew.7 Accordingly, the preemption doctrine was not applicable, and
the awarding of damages, pursuant to a common-law tort theory, was
deemed appropriate. 8 The Court's decision in Benz was based upon an
analysis of the legislative history of the Labor Management Relations
Act and turned on the fact that the primary dispute was "between
nationals of other countries operating ships under foreign laws."79 Con-
cluding that "[t]he whole background of the Act is concerned with
industrial strife between American employers and employees,""0 the
Court held that there was no indication of congressional intent, as is
required, on the extraterritorial scope of the statute. Since this intent
would not be inferred by the Court "in such a delicate field of interna-
objectives." Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942). Moreover, foreign policy
and international considerations are examples of "other congressional objectives" which
have led the Board, in its discretion, to decline to assert jurisdiction over matters which
seem to be covered by the Act. See, e.g., Contract Services, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 862 (1973),
direct review denied, 375 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Pa. 1974); AGIP, USA, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B.
1144 (1972); Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 13 N.L.R.B. 28 (1939); Panama R.R., 2
N.L.R.B. 290 (1936). Cf. Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
While a discretionary refusal by the Board to assert jurisdiction may be an additional
constraint to the Act's application to American employees working on foreign soil for
American corporations, this is a far cry from the outright lack of jurisdiction claimed by
the Board in RCA OMS.
77. 353 U.S. 138, 143 (1957). If this picketing had been arguably regulated by the
NLRB, the trial court would have lacked jurisdiction over the common-law tort claim,
under the then-applicable preemption doctrine set forth in United Constr. Workers v.
Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954). The preemption doctrine in its present
form, which would not have changed the result in Benz, is generally traced to San Diego
Bldg. & Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Compare, e.g., Int'l Longshore-
men's Ass'n, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970), with Windward
Shipping Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
78. 353 U.S. 138, 144-45 (1957). Since the trial court did not lack jurisdiction over the
common law claim, damages could be awarded to the foreign shipowner for injuries suf-
fered from even peaceful picketing. Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
79. 353 U.S. at 143.
80. Id. at 144. The ship's crew in Benz was, of course, composed of aliens, not American
nationals. No case has yet come before the Board involving the application of the Labor
Management Relations Act to the American crew of an American-owned foreign flag ship.
In such a situation, the concerns of the Act would be met, but its application may offend
the rule of international law that the law of the vessel follows its flag.
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tional relations," the Act was held not to be applicable extraterrito-
rially.5 '
Regardless of the propositions Benz arguably represents, the decision
does not support the Board's holding in RCA OMS that it lacked juris-
diction over American employees working in Greenland for an American
MNC. The Court viewed the foreign-flag ship in Benz as being the
equivalent of foreign territory.2 Given this view, any application of the
Labor Management Relations Act to the foreign crew and its shipowner
would be tantamount to the Board's asserting jurisdiction over the
French employees of a wholly French corporation at a factory in Mar-
seilles. 3 A clearer violation of a foreign state's sovereignty could not be
imagined."' In contrast, the factual situation in RCA OMS, while nomi-
nally taking place in Greenland, involved American workers and an
American employer. Certainly, Greenland had an interest in the instal-
lation itself. Greenland's concern over labor relations between the Amer-
ican employees and their American employer, however, is not nearly so
obvious. 5 Contrary to the Board's belief in RCA OMS, neither Benz nor
its prolific progeny address the issue of whether the Labor Management
Relations Act applies or can be applied to American employees working
on foreign soil for an American employer.8 Consequently, this issue
81. Id. at 147.
82. Id. at 142. See also United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922). This view was
strengthened considerably in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10
(1963), where the Court held that the Act does not apply to foreign sailors on foreign-flag
ships owned by American corporations, which operate between foreign and American
ports. The "well established rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinar.
ily governs the internal affairs of a ship" would not be disregarded, the Court said, absent
an expression of clear congressional intent to that effect. 372 U.S. at 21. Since its language
and legislative history "inescapably describes the boundaries of the Act as including only
the workingmen of our own country and its possessions," the law of the foreign flag
governed, and jurisdiction could not be deemed to exist. 372 U.S. at 18, quoting Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 144 (1957).
83. Cf. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 13 N.L.R.B. 28 (1939), where the Board held
that it had no jurisdiction over the Canadian operations of a Canadian bus company which
employed Canadian drivers.
84. See Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222, 234-35 (2d Cir.
1962) rev'd sub nom. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
85. But see Currie, supra note 74, at 79-80.
86. But see Goldberg, supra note 5, at 27-28. Benz and its progeny, stressing that the
Act is concerned with American labor relations, found a lack of jurisdiction in the follow-
ing situations: picketing by an American union of a foreign-flag ship in furtherance of a
strike by the foreign crew, Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 357 U.S. 138 (1957); a
representation petition filed by an American union covering foreign sailors on foreign-flag
ships, McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); picketing by
an American union of a foreign-flag ship in furtherance of its desire to organize the foreign
crew, Incres S.S. Co. v. Maritime Workers, 372 U.S. 24 (1963); and picketing by an
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deserves a more deliberate consideration."
American union of a foreign-flag ship in protest over wages paid to foreign seamen, Wind-
ward Shipping Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974). Cf. American Radio
Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974). Where the American union picketed
foreign-flag ships to protest substandard wages paid by those shipowners to American
longshoremen, however, the Act was held to be applicable. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970). Thus, in all but the
Ariadne case, foreign workers were involved, while RCA OMS involved American workers.
Since Ariadne did not require that the Act be applied extraterritorially, however, its
precedential value is greatly limited in a situation such as in RCA OMS.
87. Regardless of whether it applies directly to American employees working on foreign
soil for American corporations, the Labor Management Relations Act gives rise to a
number of penumbral ramifications in an RCA OMS situation. For example, it is clear
that the Board has jurisdiction over secondary boycott activities of an American union
within the United States, even though the primary employer with whom the union has a
dispute is located in a foreign country. Grain Elevator, Flour and Feed Mill Workers,
Local 418 v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932 (1967); Madden
v. Grain Elevator, Flour and Feed Mill Workers, Local 418, 334 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1964). Where the Board has jurisdiction over this secondary activity,
state law is preempted. Mountain Navigation Co. v. Seafarers Int'l Union of No. America,
348 F. Supp. 1298 (W.D. Wis. 1971); Manners Navigation Co. v. Seafarers Int'l Union of
No. America, 82 L.R.R.M. 2433 (D. Minn. 1972); Norris Grain Co. v. Nordaas, 232 Minn.
91, 46 N.W.2d 94 (1950), rehearing denied, 232 Minn. 91, 46 N.W.2d 105 (1951). Similarly,
an American corporation with foreign establishments can be unlawfully coerced within the
meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4) (1970), if the union's secondary boycott activities take
place in the United States. Teamsters, Local 25 v. New York, N.H. & N.R.R., 350 U.S.
155 (1956); Great No. Ry. v. NLRB, 272 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1959). As long as the corpora-
tion qualifies as a "person engaged in commerce," it will be protected by § 8(b)(4) even
though it is not a statutory employer. American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419
U.S. 215 (1974). If the dispute which caused the American union to engage in secondary
boycott activity is deemed to be non-labor in nature, it is unsettled as to whether the
Board would have jurisdiction. Compare NLRB v. Int'l Longshoremen Ass'n, Local 1355,
332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964); Danielson v. Fur Dressers, Local 2F, 90 L.R.R.M. 2820
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); and Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd. v. Seafarer's Int'l Union of Canada, 18
Wis. 2d 646, 110 N.W.2d 426 (1963); with National Maritime Union of America v. NLRB,
346 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965); and National Maritime Union
of America v. NLRB, 342 F.2d 538 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 835 (1965). In the
case of a non-labor dispute, however, the employer himself could still obtain an injunction
in federal court regardless of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970).
Compare Harrington & Co. v. International Longshoremen Ass'n, Local 1416, 356 F. Supp.
1079 (S.D. Fla. 1973); and West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v. Longshoremen, 90 L.R.R.M. 2260
(S.D. Tex. 1975) with Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960).
Finally, even though an American corporation with foreign establishments, under the
particular set of facts, might not qualify as a statutory employer, it could violate § 8(e)
by entering into a hot-cargo agreement with any statutory labor organization. This is true
even though § 8(e) itself refers to agreements between "employers" and labor organiza-
tions. Lufthansa German Airlines, 197 N.L.R.B. 232 (1972), aff'd sub nom. Marriott Corp.
v. NLRB, 491 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1974). Presumably, in order to violate § 8(e), the Ameri-
can corporation with foreign establishments would still have to qualify as a "person
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B. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
In order to properly develop the issue of whether the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act applies to American employees working on foreign
soil for American MNCs, it is necessary to examine the various tech-
niques of statutory analysis which the courts have relied upon in deter-
mining the territorial scope of congressional enactments.8 As will be
discussed in detail, three principal techniques have evolved, all of which
look inter alia to legislative intent in varying degrees. Although
"legislative intent" is a fairly esoteric subject to which much attention
has been given by commentators,89 in examining legislative intent, the
present article will concern itself only with such traditionally recognized
factors as statutory language, legislative history, and the underlying
policies of the act in question. While it is true that all three techniques
examine legislative intent, their respective modes of analysis differ
greatly. Indeed, inconsistent results can be reached depending upon
which technique is chosen by a court to determine the territorial scope
of a particular statute.
1. The "Traditional" Technique
The technique which has traditionally been used by courts in deter-
mining territorial scope operates upon the presumption that a statute
is intended to apply only within the physical boundaries of the United
States, unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed." As one commenta-
tor has observed, this presumption against extraterritoriality "has been
engaged in commerce." Cf. American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215
(1974).
88. Prior to construing a statute to determine whether Congress intended it to be ap-
plied extraterritorially, the threshold question of legislative power must be answered.
Nationality, however, is sufficient in itself as a basis for jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 30(1)(a) (1965). See notes
46-48 supra. Hence, it is clear that the issue of whether a statute can be applied extraterri-
torially, "so far as citizens of the United States in foreign countries are concerned, is one
of construction, not of legislative power." Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437
(1932).
89. Compare, e.g., Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and
Statutory Interpretation in the Modern Federal Courts, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. 1299 (1975),
with Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: A Peek into the Mind and Will of a Legislature,
50 IND. L.J. 206 (1975).
90. See generally J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (4th ed. Sands 1973); R.
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975).
91. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932); Sandberg v. McDon-
ald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347,
357 (1909).
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an albatross which the [Supreme] Court has struggled to remove al-
most ever since [its inception]."9 The presumption itself can be traced
to a willingness on the part of the judiciary to accept the following
assumptions: (1) because an Act of Congress, if possible, ought never to
be construed to violate the "law of nations, '9 3 courts should apply stat-
utes extraterritorially, in derogation of international law, only if Con-
gress clearly intended this result;94 and (2) because Congress is primarily
concerned with domestic conditions, statutes are ordinarily intended to
apply only within the physical boundaries of the United States.15 Of
course, if international law would not be transgressed were a statute to
be applied extraterritorially, then the first assumption would appear to
be groundless, and the presumption of territoriality would logically not
come into play. Given the presumption does not arise, a court simply
determines the territorial scope of the congressional enactment through
ordinary rules of statutory construction.
Two Supreme Court cases are illustrative of the mechanics and
nuances of the traditional technique. In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 7
the Court was faced with the issue of whether the Lanham Act 8 governs
an American citizen infringing an American trademark in a foreign
country. The alleged infringer, after purchasing unfinished watches in
the United States, stamped the watches in Mexico with the Bulova
trademark, and sold them in Mexico in competition with the real Bulova
product.9 Utilizing ordinary rules of statutory construction, the Court
interpreted the Act as applying in this transnational factual situation.,0
92. Currie, supra note 74, at 57.
93. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); Murray v. Schooner Charm-
ing Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 450, 452 (1804).
94. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10, 19-22 (1963); Foley
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 292 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 388 Reporters' Notes 1-
2, at 108-11 (1965).
95. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
96. Jones, An Interest Analysis Approach to Extraterritorial Application of Rule 10b-
5, 52 TEx. L. REV. 983, 988 (1974); Note, The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA s
Environmental Impact Statement Requirement, 74 MICH. L. REV. 349, 354-58 (1975). Cf.
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Gilmore, 207 U.S. 398
(1907), which did not utilize the presumption of territoriality when a statute was sought
to be applied to acts committed by American citizens in areas subject to the laws of no
sovereign. In such a situation, there is no possibility of violating another country's laws.
See also United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922), involving the application of crimi-
nal statutes beyond American territorial limits.
97. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
98. Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq. (1970).
99. 344 U.S. 281-82 (1952).
100. Id. at 285-87.
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Since Mexican courts had previously nullified the infringer's Bulova
trademark in that country, the court noted that there was no possibility
of conflict with Mexican law through application of the Lanham Act
extraterritorially."" Accordingly, the presumption of territoriality did
not come into play because "the United States is not debarred by any
rule of international law from governing the conduct of its own citizens
upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of other
nations or their nationals are not infringed.""1 '
In contrast to the Steele decision, in Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo"'3 the
Supreme Court utilized the presumption of territoriality. In this case,
the Court was confronted with the issue of whether the overtime provi-
sions of the Eight Hours Law'"' applied to work done by American em-
ployees on construction projects in Iraq and Iran under a contract be-
tween the United States and an American company. Because the Court
found that labor conditions such as those which were sought to be regu-
lated in Foley Bros. by the Eight Hours Law were "the primary concern
of a foreign country,"' 5 the presumption of territoriality was superim-
posed upon the ordinary rules of statutory construction.' Conse-
quently, the Court, "in the absence of a clearly expressed purpose,"
refused to infer that Congress intended to apply the statute extraterrito-
rially, and held that the Act was therefore inapplicable.101
101. Id. at 289.
102. Id. at 285-86, quoting Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941). Cf. The Queen
v. Jameson, [1896] 2 Q.B. 425, 430. See also Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T.E. Eaton Co.,
234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956) (Trademark Act could not
be applied extraterritorially against a foreign national acting under a trademark deemed
valid by his own country). The court in Steele also discussed the effects of the illegal
foreign activity within the United States. The "effects" doctrine itself is not controlling
when jurisdiction is sought over an American citizen situated in a foreign country. Still,
the presence of effects within the United States resulting from the foreign activities of an
American citizen can be crucial under the ordinary rules of statutory analysis. One
important factor which is examined in such an analysis is whether applying the statute
in question extraterritorially would advance its underlying policies. Since Congress is
primarily concerned with domestic conditions, however, Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281, 285 (1949), the domestic effects of foreign activities, as they relate to the underlying
policies of the statute under scrutiny "are often decisive" in determining the issue of
territorial scope. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952).
103. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
104. 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-326 (1970).
105. 336 U.S. at 286.
106. Id. at 285.
107. Id. at 286. Cf. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948), where the Fair
Labor Standards Act was applied extraterritorially to a military base leased in Bermuda,
because the base was construed to be a "possession" within the meaning of the Act.
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While the mechanics of the traditional technique were properly fol-
lowed in Foley Bros., the result is nevertheless flawed due to the Court's
improper finding that the labor conditions at issue were "the primary
concern of a foreign country."° 8 In making this finding, the Court placed
considerable reliance on the "scheme of the Act" as indicated by its
remark:
No distinction is drawn therein between laborers who are aliens and
those who are citizens of the United States. Unless we were to read such
a distinction into the statute we should be forced to conclude, under the
respondent's reasoning, that Congress intended to regulate the working
hours of a citizen of Iran who chanced to be employed on a public work
of the United States in that foreign land. Such a conclusion would be
logically inescapable although labor conditions were known to be wholly
dissimilar to those in the United States and wholly beyond the control
of this nation. 19
However, this "logically inescapable conclusion" does not withstand
careful analysis. Before a statute can be construed, the threshold ques-
tion of Congressional legislative jurisdiction must be addressed. When
a statute is sought to be applied extraterritorially to regulate the con-
duct of an American citizen, nationality is itself sufficient as a basis for
finding jurisdictional power."' A foreigner acting completely outside the
United States, however, obviously does not provide this same basis of
jurisdiction. In such a case, the foreigner must generally engage in con-
duct which has a substantial and forseeable effect within the United
States before Congress will be deemed to have the power to assert legis-
lative jurisdiction.'' In Foley Bros., the Court never addressed the
108. 336 U.S. at 286.
109. Id.
110. See note 88 supra.
111. This is part of the infamous "effects" doctrine. Under this doctrine, a country has
the power to assert jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside its borders, even as to
foreign citizens situated in foreign territory, so long as that conduct produces effects
within the forum country's borders. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965). There are limitations upon the doctrine. See id. at §
18(b); United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945) (decision by Second
Circuit Court of Appeals upon certification and transfer from the U.S. Supreme Court for
failure of a quorum of qualified justices, 322 U.S. 716 (1944)). If the conduct of a foreigner
abroad has the requisite domestic effects, then Congress has the power to assert legislative
jurisdiction. The statute itself, however, must still be analyzed to determine whether
extraterritorial application was intended. Cf. note 88 supra. The application of American
antitrust and securities laws to foreigners abroad illustrates the mechanics of this two step
process. First, the activities of the foreigners abroad must have the requisite domestic
effects. Secondly, since Congress clearly intended to apply antitrust and securities laws
extraterritorially against foreigners, these laws will be given extraterritorial effect, even if
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crucial issue of whether Congress even had the power to legislate regula-
tory jurisdiction over alien workers in Iran. If Congress did not possess
this power, then the lack of distinction in the Act between American and
alien laborers, which the Court found to be important, would have been
irrelevant, and a conclusion predicated on this reasoning is ill-founded.
Furthermore, the presumption against extraterritoriality was prema-
turely superimposed upon the ordinary rules of statutory construction.
On the basis of independent analysis, the Court initially should have
addressed the issue of whether application of the Act to Americans
working in Iran for an American company would have transgressed in-
ternational law. This issue is totally distinct from the issue of whether
application of the Act to aliens working in Iran for an American com-
pany would infringe upon a "primary concern of a foreign country."
Since the Court did not make an independent analysis as to the Ameri-
can workers, its decision in Foley Bros., if not its use of the traditional
technique, is at best questionable.
2. The "Contacts" Technique
The second theory of statutory analysis which courts have applied in
determining the territorial scope of a congressional enactment, the
"contacts" technique, has its origins in the Supreme Court decision of
Lauritzen v. Larsen."2 Under this technique, a court initially examines
the interests being advanced by the statute under scrutiny. In light of
those interests, the court then ascertains and weights each point of
contact between the transaction forming the basis of the lawsuit and
the countries affected. If American interests are deemed to be
international law is thereby transgressed. See, e.g., Trautman, Application Abroad of
American Regulatory Legislation-The General Framework, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
REGULATION 263 (Practising Law Inst. 1973); Bator, Extraterritorial Application of Low:
United States Securities Laws, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 141 (Supp. 1970); Kintner & Haligarten,
Application of United States Antitrust Laws to Foreign Trade and Commerce- Variations
on American Banana Since 1909, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 343 (1973); Maw, United
States Antitrust Law Abroad-The Enduring Problem of Extraterritoriality, 40 A.B.A.
ANrrIRusr L.J. 796 (1971). But see note 72 supra. The doctrine, however, has been severely
criticized by commentators. See, e.g., A. NEATE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 360-
72 (2d ed. 1970); Henry, The United States Antitrust Laws: A Canadian Viewpoint, 8 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 249 (1970); Jones, supra note 72, at 985-87. In any event, the effects doctrine
is not controlling when jurisdiction is sought over an American citizen situated in a foreign
country, since nationality alone is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18, comment (a) at 47 (1965).
Nevertheless, even in this area, "[u]nlawful effects in this country . . . are often decisive
." Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952).
112. 345 U.S. 571 (1953). See also New York Cent. R.R. v. Chisolm, 268 U.S. 29 (1925).
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"substantial," the statute should be applied to the transnational factual
situation."'
For example, in Lauritzen, the question before the Court was whether
the Jones Act"' applied to a Danish seaman who, after joining the crew
of a Danish ship in New York City, was negligently injured while the
ship was anchored in Havana harbor."5 After examining the language,
legislative history and underlying policies of the Act, the Court pro-
ceeded to identify the relevant contacts."' While Denmark, the United
States, and Cuba each could claim contacts with the transaction form-
ing the basis of the lawsuit,"7 the Court, in weighing those contacts,
found "an overwhelming preponderance in favor of Danish law."" 8 Ac-
cordingly, the Jones Act was held inapplicable to the transnational facts
of Lauritzen."9
The importance of the "contacts" technique in the area of interna-
tional labor relations should not be overstated however. In addition to
having received a fair amount of criticism,' 0 the technique has been
explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court within the context of the Labor
Management Relations Act.'2 '
113. This second theory, which is particularly prevalent in the area of maritime torts,
is generally known as the contacts theory of conflict of laws. See generally G. GILMORE &
C. BLAcK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY 386-94 (1957); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw 344-
47 (1968).
114. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
115. 345 U.S. at 573.
116. Id. at 579-83.
117. Id. at 582-83.
118. Id. at 592. The "connecting factors" which the court indicated were relevant to this
maritime tort claim were: (1) place of the wrongful act (lex loci delicti commissi);
(2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) allegiance of the
defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum; and
(7) law of the forum. Id. at 583-92.
119. Id. at 592-93. For other examples of the Lauritzen technique, see, e.g., Hellenic
Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970); Romero v. Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354 (1959); Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 173
F. Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 273 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 988 (1960).
120. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963);
Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171,
176-77; Currie, supra note 74, at 43-46; Jones, supra note 72, at 989. But see Comment,
The Transnational Reach of Rule 10-5, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1392-403 (1973).
121. At one time, the NLRB utilized the Lauritzen approach to determine whether it
had jurisdiction over foreign-flag ships. See, e.g., Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 136 N.L.R.B.
389 (1962); West India Fruit & S.S. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 343 (1961); Peninsular & Occidental
S.S. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1958). The Supreme Court, however, explicitly rejected the
Board's use of the contacts technique in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros,
372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963).
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3. The "Governmental Interest" Technique
Labeled by commentators as the "governmental interest theory," the
third technique of statutory analysis has been used extensively by the
Supreme Court to determine the territorial scope of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act.' The technique essentially incorporates the inter-
est analysis approach from the conflict of laws area.' Under the theory,
a court first determines the policies behind the relevant laws of all
countries having an apparent interest in the transaction or circumstan-
ces which form the basis of the controversy. If one country's policies
would be advanced through application of its law, while other countries'
policies would not thereby be disturbed, a "false" conflict is said to exist
as only the former country has a real interest in applying its law to the
controversy. In the case of a false conflict, the law of that country whose
policies would be advanced as determined from the relevant statutes is
controlling. However, when the transaction in question affects the inter-
ests of two or more countries, a "true" conflict exists. In this case,
assuming the court has jurisdiction in the broader sense, 2 ' if the
interests of the forum country are substantially advanced by the appli-
cation of its laws, the law of the forum will be applied.'25
The Supreme Court decisions in Windward Shipping Ltd. v.
122. The series of relevant Supreme Court cases consists of "The Benz case and its
progeny," referred to in note 86 supra.
123. See E. CHEATHAM, E. GRISWOLD, W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES ON CONFLICT
OF LAWS 477-78 (5th ed. 1964); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICrs LAW 222-25 (1968); Currie,
The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial
Function, 26 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 9 (1958).
124. See notes 72, 88 & 111 supra.
125. Oftentimes, in dealing with a potential conflict of laws problem, the law of the
foreign jurisdiction and its underlying policies may be unclear, especially when the juris-
dictions having an apparent interest in the transaction are countries rather than states.
In the context of the Labor Management Relations Act, however, where the issue is not
which country's law shall apply, but simply whether the Act should apply, the murkiness
of the foreign country's law is not fatal to the governmental interest technique.
Under a strict governmental interest theory, as long as there are any American interests
being served by the Labor Management Relations Act which would be furthered by its
being applied to the transaction in question, an American court would be constrained to
comply with the will of Congress whether the conflict was "true" or "false." Contrary to
the "strict" theory, the governmental interest theory generally requires the furtherance
of a substantial American interest for the Act to be applied. See E. CHEATHAM, E. GRIS-
woLD, W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES ON THE CONFLIcr OF LAWS 477-78 (5th ed. 1964);
B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183-84 (1963). This facet of the
"governmental interest" approach to the conflict of laws has been criticized. See R.
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 224-25 (1968). Nevertheless, under either theory the
substance of the foreign law need not be analyzed in ascertaining whether the Act should
be applied in a given case.
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American Radio Ass'n" and International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local
1416, AFL-CIO v. Ariadne Shipping Co.2 7 are illustrative of the gov-
ernmental interest technique.'2 Within the context of federal preemp-
tion, '2 both cases involved peaceful picketing by American unions of
foreign-flag ships, temporarily docked at American ports, in protest over
allegedly substandard wages. 3 ' While the picketing in Ariadne was di-
rected at wages paid by the foreign-flag ship owners to American long-
shoremen,' 3' the picketing in Windward Shipping was aimed at wages
paid by such owners to foreign seamen.Y
3 2
Each decision began with the proposition that Congress had the power
to exercise legislative jurisdiction over foreign-flag ships within Ameri-
can territorial waters.13 Moreover, if interpreted literally, the jurisdic-
tional formula of the Labor Management Relations Act appears suffi-
ciently broad for one to infer that Congress intended that the Act apply
to each set of circumstances.'34 However, given the transnational nature
of the factual situation, the Court, using the governmental interest tech-
nique, examined the policies sought to be advanced by the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act. In each case the Court maintained that the Act
was a "bill of rights for American workingmen and their employers.' 35
However, in the determination as to whether the policies behind the
Act would be furthered by its application to the given factual situations,
the decisions diverged. Because the picketers in Ariadne were protesting
substandard wages being paid to American workers and application of
the Labor Management Relations Act "would have threatened no inter-
ference in the internal affairs of foreign-flag ships likely to lead to con-
flict with foreign or international law," the policies behind the Act were
advanced by the holding that such picketing was regulated by federal
law. '3 Accordingly, state court jurisdiction to issue an injunction under
126. 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
127. 397 U.S. 195 (1970).
128. The Supreme Court has not applied a strict "governmental interest" theory in the
Benz line of cases. See note 125 supra. Rather, the presence of dominant contacts with
one country or another has also been considered. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW
330 (1968).
129. See note 77 supra.
130. 415 U.S. at 106-07; 397 U.S. at 196-97.
131. 397 U.S. at 196.
132. 415 U.S. at 114.
133. See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 142 (1957), citing Wilden-
bus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
134. 415 U.S. at 112-13.
135. Id. at 110; 397 U.S. 195, 198-99, both referring to Benz v. Compania Naviera
Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 144 (1957).
136. 397 U.S. at 200.
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such circumstances was held to be preempted.'37 On the other hand, the
picketers in Windward Shipping were protesting substandard wages
being paid to foreign seamen. Since "[v]irtually none of the predictable
responses of a foreign shipowner to picketing of this type . . . would be
limited to the sort of wage-cost decision benefitting American working-
men which the Labor Management Relations Act was designed to regu-
late," the policies behind the Act would not be furthered by its applica-
tion under these circumstances.' Consequently, state court jurisdiction
to issue an injunction curtailing picketing deemed tortious under state
law was held not to be preempted in Windward Shipping.'39
C. EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
As has already been discussed, even though international law does not
operate as a constraint, neither the Board nor the courts have directly
examined the issue of whether the Labor Management Relations Act
applies to American employees working on foreign soil for American
MNCs. Regardless of which statutory technique is used to ascertain the
possible extraterritorial application of the Act, however, the conclusion
should be that the Act does have such extraterritorial effect.
1. Statutory Language, Legislative History, and Underlying Purposes
Since the most logical place to begin an analysis of the territorial
scope of the Labor Management Relations Act is with the Act itself, it
should first be noted that the type of activity which triggers jurisdiction
under the Act involves circumstances "affecting commerce.""'4 Section
2(6) defines "commerce" to mean:
trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the
several States, or between the District of Columbia or any territory of
the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any
foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or
within the District of Columbia or any Territory or between points in the
same State but through any other State or any territory or the District
of Columbia or any foreign country.'
The term "affecting commerce" is defined by Section 2(7) as meaning:
137. Id. at 200-01.
138. 415 U.S. at 115.
139. Id. at 115-16.
140. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970); 29 U.S.C. §159(c)
(1970).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1970) (emphasis added).
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in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening
or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce."'
Although it is well recognized that Congress has the power to assert
legislative jurisdiction over American citizens located outside of the
United States,' if interpreted literally, the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act would apply not only to American employees working on for-
eign soil for an American corporation,' but also to French employees
working in Marseilles for a French concern.'45 As the Supreme Court has
recognized on several occasions, however, a simple reading of the statute
is not determinative of its territorial scope.'" Other factors, such as
legislative history and the policies underlying the statute, must also be
considered regardless of which technique of statutory analysis is chosen.
Consequently, the Labor Management Relations Act must be viewed in
its appropriate context.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1970).
143. See note 88 supra.
144. See, e.g., Windward Shipping Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104, 112-
13 (1974). The jurisdictional formula of most federal labor statutes precludes all inquiry
as to whether Congress intended extraterritorial application. See, e.g., Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 702, 706(f), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1, 2000e-5(F)(3) (Supp. IV
1974); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 3(3), 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 651(3), 651(8)
(1970); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, § 13(f), 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (1964).
Regarding the history of Section 13(f) of the FLSA, see Goldberg, supra note 5, at 30-32.
The jurisdictional formula of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970), would
seem to preclude all inquiry as to territorial scope. Coverage under the Railway Labor Act,
which is applicable to railroads and airlines, is limited to activities within the jurisdiction
of the ICC, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 151 (First), 151 (Fifth) (1970). This extends
"only insofar as such transportation ... takes place within the United States." 49 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1), 1(2) (1970). See United States v. Pennsylvania R.R., 323 U.S. 612 (1945). Even
so, a fair amount of litigation has been spawned regarding the extraterritorial application
of the RLA against airlines. Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 189
F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951) (holding that dispatchers hired by
an American-owned airline operating wholly outside of the United States are not covered
by the bargaining provisions of the RLA); Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 267 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 901 (1959);
Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 369
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 273 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 988 (1960) (the latter
two cases holding that employees working on flights which travel solely between points in
foreign countries are not covered by the RLA, even though the flights began or ended in
the United States). See generally Note, Railway Labor Act-Coverage-International Air
Carriage, 35 J. Am L. & CoM. 100 (1969); Goldberg, supra note 5, at 26-27. For a criticism
of this literal adherence to the RLA's jurisdictional provisions against airlines, see Currie,
supra note 74, at 82 n.189.
145. See Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222, 231 (2d Cir.
1962), rev'd sub nom. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
146. See note 88 supra.
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The plight of the American workingman, as well as his attempts to
improve the terms and conditions of his employment through concerted
activity, have been given attention only recently by federal law.
Originally, American courts held that any combination on the part of
the workmen to raise their wages was illegal. 7 As this doctrine waned,
the federal labor injunction took its place as the legal method by which
unionism was discouraged.'48 It was not until 1914, when the Clayton Act
was passed, that Congress gave even theoretical acknowledgement to
the right of employees to organize and to bargain collectively., Federal
labor injunctions continued to plague union efforts, 150 however, until
147. Commonwealth v. Pullis (Philadelphia Cordwainer's Case), collected in 3 Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 59-250 (J. Commons & L. Gilmore eds.
1910).
148. R. SMITH, L. MERIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 22-23 (5th ed.
1974). The federal preliminary injunction was deadly to union activity, and suffered from
severe procedural shortcomings. See, e.g., Great Northern Ry. v. Brousseau, 286 F. 414
(D.N.D. 1923). See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930);
C. MoRRis, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 7 (1971). As early as 1896, the rumblings of future
congressional discontent could be seen on the horizon, as evidenced by the Democratic
platform of that year:
We denounce arbitrary interference by Federal authorities in local affairs as a
violation of the Constitution of the United States and a crime against free institu-
tions, and we especially object to government by injunction as a new and highly
dangerous form of oppression by which Federal Judges, in contempt of the laws
of the States and rights of citizens, become at once legislators, judges and execu-
tioners.
Quoted in McCulloch, New Problems in the Administration of the Labor-Management
Relations Act: The Taft-Hartley Injunction, 16 Sw. L.J. 82, 87-88 (1962) (emphasis
added). Bills were introduced to curb the federal labor injunction for twenty consecutive
years between 1894 and 1914. President Roosevelt sent five consecutive messages to Con-
gress stressing the need for reform. President Taft, in his 1909 State of the Union Message,
spoke extensively about the evils of the labor injunction. McCulloch, supra, at 88.
149. The Clayton Act states that "[tihe labor of a human being is not a commodity
or article of commerce." Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970), formerly ch. 323, § 6, 38
Stat. 731 (1914). The Clayton Act also limits the power of federal courts to issue injunc-
tions in labor disputes. Clayton Act § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), formerly ch. 323, § 20, 38
Stat. 738 (1914). Section 6 further provided that nonenjoinable union conduct was not in
violation of federal antitrust laws.
150. Although Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, de-
scribed the Clayton Act as the "industrial magna charta," 21 AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST 971
(1914), federal courts were to narrowly construe the sections dealing with the labor injunc-
tions. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 148, at 175. See, e.g., Bedford Cut Stone v.
Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927) (union refusal to work on stone
quarried by opponents of the union); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443
(1921) (secondary boycott); but cf. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921) (picketers could not be enjoined from peaceful persuasion).
In spite of Section 20 of the Clayton Act, injunctions were granted by federal courts in
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Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932.51 By depriving
federal courts of jurisdiction over peaceful and nonfraudulent labor dis-
putes,'52 the Norris-LaGuardia Act solved the injunction problem, but
still provided no substantive protection to the right of employees to
freely choose their bargaining representatives.'53
The economic conditions of the 1930s indicated that the time was
right for Congress to provide such protection.'54 Assuming one could find
employment, working conditions were poor and devastating strikes were
widespread.' 5 Industrial peace, in the form of stable labor management
relations, was in the best interest of employers, workers, and the general
public.' While the first real attempt at a legislative solution, the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act,'51 would ultimately fail,' the origins of
the Wagner Act of 1935 were already in evidence by 1934.59
Prior to the passage of the Wagner Act of 1935, labor-management
ten of the next thirteen cases in which Section 20 was invoked. McCulloch, supra note
148, at 89.
151. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970).
152. "The underlying aim of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to restore the broad purpose
which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton Act but which was frustrated,
so Congress believed, by unduly restrictive judicial construction." United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235-36 (1941). This aim was "to take the Federal courts out of
the business of granting injunctions in labor disputes, except where violence and fraud
are present. . . ." Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 27 F. Supp. 915, 918 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 105 F.2d
948 (3d Cir. 1939).
153. Section 2, in setting forth the public policy of the Act, affirmed the right of employ-
ees to choose freely their bargaining representatives. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1968). As with the
Clayton Act, however, no mechanisms were provided to protect this right. F. DULLES,
LABOR IN AMERICA 276 (2d rev. ed. 1960). The Norris-LaGuardia Act also evidenced a
congressional belief "that the government should not resolve labor disputes or substitute
its wage or price determinations for private contracts in a free market." A. Cox, LAW AND
THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 5 (1960).
154. MORRIS, supra note 148, at 25.
155. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 12029, in NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1207 (1949) (Senator LaFollette) [hereinafter cited as NLRA LEGIS-
LATIvE HISTORY]; 79 CONG. REC. 4707 NLRA LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY 2842 (Representative
Connery); 79 CONG. REC. 4707 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 299 (Representative Blanton).
156. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Cf.
Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) (constitutionality of Railway
Labor Act of 1926, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1970)).
157. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195.
158. See I. BERNSTEIN, TuRsULENT YEARS 172-185 (1970). As a final blow, § 3 of the
NLRA was held to be an unconstitutional delegation of power to the President. A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
159. See generally Madden, The Origin and Early History of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 234 (1960).
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relations were not functioning smoothly, and the economy was suffering
as a result. According to Congress, the reason for this inefficiency was
"[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees . . .and
employers . . .[which] tends to aggravate recurrent business depres-
sions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earn-
ers in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage
rates and working conditions within and between industries."'' 0 The
Wagner Act was intended to remedy these defects by providing a legal
framework under which workingmen could achieve some degree of bar-
gaining power in order to negotiate with management on relatively equal
terms. The declared policy of the Wagner Act makes this clear:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employ-
ment or other mutual aid or protection. 6 '
While other methods were available,'62 collective bargaining was cho-
sen as the mechanism for achieving the desperately needed stability in
labor management relations.' Unfortunately, one-sided in nature, the
160. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). See also MORIuS, supra note 148, at 25-26.
161. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
162. See, e.g., Railway Labor Act of 1926, as amended. The Railway Labor Act relies
upon compulsory arbitration through the National Mediation Board as well as upon
collective bargaining. While the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 subsequently provided facilities
for the mediation and arbitration of disputes through the Conciliation Service of the
Department of Labor, participation is not compulsory. 29 U.S.C. § 173 (1970). As the
Supreme Court has noted:
[The Wagner Act] does not compel any agreement whatever .... The theory
of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives
of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjust-
ments and agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt to compel.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1936). See NLRB v. Bums Int'l
Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 282 (1972) (successorship doctrine, wherein the Court
stated "Congress has consistently declined to interfere with free collective bargaining");
H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). Cf. Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365
U.S. 667, 676-77 (1961); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952).
Two exceptions to this general reluctance to interfere with free collective bargaining are
the impositon of collective bargaining during wartime, and, on occasion, during railway
strikes. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 282 n.7 (1972).
163. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970); SENATE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, S. REP. No.
573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935). Cf. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
453-54 (1957); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939).
[Vol. I0:I
The Labor Management Relations Act
Wagner Act provided unions and employees with an unfair advantage.' 64
In order to eliminate this advantage and thereby provide a more effi-
cient framework, Congress, in 1947, enacted the Labor Management
Relations Act, better known as the Taft-Hartley Act. As if the Wagner
Act had not been clear on this point, the Labor Management Relations
Act unequivocally declared the great interest which the public had in
stable labor-management relations.' 5 If the Wagner Act put labor and
management in the same arena, providing rules for a more orderly brand
of combat, then the Labor Management Relations Act refined those
rules, and put up ropes around the ring to prevent the combatants from
spilling over into the crowd.
While the rules of the game have continually been refined, the under-
lying policies of the Labor Management Relations Act have remained
virtually unchanged over time. The focal point of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act is still the relationship between employers and em-
ployees. All of the desirable effects which the Act seeks to pro-
mote-better terms and conditions of employment for employees, in-
dustrial peace for employers, improved economic conditions for society
in general-are still premised on the concept of healthy bargaining rela-
tionships.'66 These desirable effects, however, have never been sought on
a world-wide scale. Indeed, such goals are rather ambitious solely on a
domestic level. For this reason, labor legislation, perhaps even more so
than other types of legislation, tends to be oriented exclusively toward
domestic concerns.' 7 An examination of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act's legislative history makes it clear that this Act is no excep-
164. MORRIS, supra note 148, at 28-29.
165. Industrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of commerce and
with the full production of articles and commodities for commerce, can be avoided
or substantially minimized if employers, employees, and labor organizations each
recognize under law one another's legitimate rights in their relations with each
other, and above all recognize under the law that neither party has any right...
to jeopardize the public health, safety, or interest.
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in
their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for
preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to
protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organiza-
tions whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the
part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the
general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor
disputes affecting commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
166. See note 160 supra and accompanying text, and note 165 supra.
167. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
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tion.6 5 Inasmuch as Congress never mentioned the situation involving
American employees working for American companies in foreign coun-
tries, and probably never even contemplated it, the issue concerning the
extraterritorial application of the Act hinges, therefore, on whether con-
gressional intent may be inferred. Given that the wording of the statute
permits application under such circumstances,'69 it is crucial to examine
whether the interests which the Labor Management Relations Act seeks
to promote would be furthered by applying the Act to American employ-
ees working on foreign soil for American MNCs. 170 This examination will
be made within the context of the three techniques of statutory analysis
previously discussed.
2. Inferring Congressional Intent Under the Three Techniques of
Statutory Analysis
Under the traditional technique of statutory analysis, a court may
infer that Congress intended an act to apply extraterritorially, only
when it is first shown that such application would not transgress inter-
national law. In the absence of this showing, the presumption of territo-
riality must be accorded weight, and a statute can be applied outside
of the United States only if Congress clearly intended such a result.,
Since the Labor Management Relations Act concededly does not exhibit
this clear intent, the ramifications of international law become critically
important under the traditional technique. This article has already
demonstrated, however, that application of the Labor Management Re-
168. See generally Currie, supra note 74, at 49-50. The Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Labor Management Relations Act's legislative history has been that it "inescapably
describes the boundaries of the Act as including only the workingmen of our own country
and its possessions." Windward Shipping Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104, 110
(1974), quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 144 (1957).
169. See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
170. Cf. United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290 (1951); Hamilton v.
Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 419 (1899); United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Peters) 72, 75-
76 (1838); Extraterritorial Scope of the Antitrust Laws of the United States and of the
Communities and Member States, in COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST: OVERLAP
AND CONFLICr 50-116 (J. Rahl ed. 1970); Bator, ExtraterritorialApplication of Law: United
States Securities Laws, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 141 (Supp. 1970); Craig, Application of the
Trading with the Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations Owned by Americans: Reflections
on Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARv. L. REV. 579 (1970); Kauder, Taxation of Domestically
Controlled Foreign Corporations: A Comparative Study of Subpart F and Section 482, 14
ViLL. L. REV. 260 (1969); Comment, The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations-A Solu-
tion to the United States Balance of Payments Crisis?, 55 MARQ. L. REv. 553, 673-75
(1972); Comment, The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA's Environmental Impact State-
ment Requirement, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 349 (1975).
171. See notes 91-96 supra and accompanying text.
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lations Act to American employees working on foreign soil for American
corporations would not transgress international law.' Accordingly, or-
dinary rules of statutory analysis are controlling in this situation, and
congressional intent may be inferred.1
3
Since the American interests which the Labor Management Relations
Act seeks to promote would be furthered by applying the Act to Ameri-
can employees working on foreign soil for American corporations, it is
submitted that congressional intent should be inferred under the tradi-
tional technique of statutory analysis. The history of the American labor
movement and the legislative responses which it engendered establish
that healthy bargaining relationships are a fundamental goal of Ameri-
can labor policy. However, these relationships, at least as far as the
Labor Management Relations Act is concerned, are deemed valuable
more because of their desirable effects than for their own sake. Thus,
collective bargaining relationships have been considered by Congress to
be worthy targets of regulation, because the interests of American work-
ers, American employees, and the American public are all furthered by
stability in this area.
Viewed in this context, the situs of the relationship has only a mar-
ginal impact upon the interests which the Labor Management Relations
Act seeks to advance. The nationality of the participants is much more
relevant in this respect. Even when the situs is a foreign country, the
interests of American employees and employers are ipso facto furthered
by a healthy bargaining relationship between such workers and employ-
ers. The location of the situs, however, does have importance with re-
spect to the effects of such relationship on the American public, which
effects create other interests to be protected under the Act. Naturally,
the effects on the American public are diminished if the situs is abroad.
Nevertheless, the benefits derived from the mere existence of the bar-
gaining relationships are probably sufficient to infer a congressional
intent in support of the extraterritorial application of the Act, even if
the economic welfare of the American public in general were not ad-
vanced by such relationships. However, although the impact on the
American economy is obviously greater when an American situs is in-
volved, it is not true that the bargaining relationships centered abroad
do not promote the general economic welfare of the American public.
For example, the effect of a strike upon the flow of goods to or within
the United States is likely to be greater when the strike occurs within
the United States. However, while healthy bargaining relationships are
172. See notes 34-71 supra and accompanying text.
173. But see Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949), which is discussed in
detail at notes 103-111 supra and accompanying text.
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more apt to soften the impact of an American strike when the primary
parties are located in the United States, this is not necessarily the case.
Sympathy strikes, boycotts, and refusals to work on struck production
may be just as harmful when a union's primary dispute occurs abroad
with an American MNC with American employees.
For example, the extension of MNC facilities abroad may make the
parent company particularly vulnerable to any international economic
action against the foreign subsidiaries. Thus, if a corporation is highly
integrated with specialized functions carried out in different countries,
economic action at a foreign situs against operations essential for contin-
ued home country production would have a significant impact on the
corporation's worldwide, as well as American, operations. Such disrup-
tive economic action abroad would in all likelihood affect exports to
and imports from the affected foreign operations thereby negatively
influencing production and employment in the parent company in the
United States.
It is true that the more obvious economic effects of stable wage rates,
which the Labor Management Relations Act seeks to promote through
greater equality in bargaining power, are likely to be more substantial
within the United States when an American situs is involved. 7 4 One
reason is that American employees living and working abroad typically
spend their earnings in the foreign country rather than in the United
States. However, significant American effects still result from stable
wage rates within and between industries comprised of domestic and
overseas corporations employing American workers. The efficient alloca-
tion of scarce labor resources, particularly of American specialists who
are most frequently recruited for overseas employment, requires that
any disparity in wages between American employees at home and
abroad reflect, so far as possible, differences in supply and demand. To
the extent that the Labor Management Relations Act succeeds in stabi-
lizing wage rates by providing a framework for a healthy bargaining
relationship between American workers and employers, scarce Ameri-
can labor resources are more efficiently allocated. Regardless of the
174. Of course, wage rates are not the only subject of collective bargaining. Thus, the
total scope of the economic package (pensions, holidays, vacations, etc.) regulated at a
foreign situs may affect negotiations in the home country if on the whole a great
"economic" disparity occurs between the negotiated host and home country benefits. A
real fear also exists that an MNC may be caught in a gigantic international whipsaw
strike action if its worldwide work force attempts to capitalize on the national bargaining
peculiarities in the different countries of the MNC's operations (e.g., West Germany
places emphasis on high wages and low pension benefits but Switzerland emphasizes lower
wages but higher pension benefits), thereby obtaining the best of all benefits. The impact
of both situations would be great even though a foreign situs was involved.
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situs of the economic action or of those bargaining relationships, the
American economy is thereby benefitted.
One final example of the negligibility of the location of the bargaining
situs or economic action situs can be gleaned from the goal of industrial
peace. Industrial peace, which results from stable collective bargaining
relationships, is sought by employers primarily because of its favorable
impact upon profits. To the extent that an American company is able
to boost profits through industrial peace, the economic interests of the
American public are furthered since additional tax revenue is made
available to the United States, and domestic as well as foreign expendi-
tures and investments are increased. These desirable effects occur, how-
ever, whether the American corporation which employs American work-
ers is located in the United States or in a foreign country.'
In sum, all of the American interests which the Labor Management
Relations Act seeks to promote are furthered when the Act is applied to
American employees working on foreign soil for American corporations.
Accordingly, under the first technique of statutory analysis, it should be
inferred that Congress intended the Act to apply extraterritorially in
such circumstances.
Under the "contacts" technique, assuming that it might still be used
by a court in determining the territorial scope of the Labor Management
Relations Act in a nonmaritime situation,7 ' the interests being ad-
vanced by the statute under scrutiny are first identified. 7 7 In the case
of the Labor Management Relations Act, those interests include stable
collective bargaining relationships, and their desirable impact upon
American workers, employers, and society. 7 8 Next, the relevant contacts
are examined in light of the previously identified interests.79 In a situa-
175. While these same domestic effects can occur when foreign employees work on
foreign soil for American companies, it is crucial that the statutory analysis remain sepa-
rate for American employees. Otherwise, the same mistakes which the Supreme Court
made in Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949), are unavoidable. See notes 103-
11 supra and accompanying text. When the analysis is kept separate, the issue of what
domestic effects occur when foreign employees are involved never arises. Even assuming
that an adequate basis existed for asserting jurisdiction, international law would be trans-
gressed by applying the Labor Management Relations Act to foreigners working abroad.
See note 51 supra. Accordingly, the presumption of territoriality would come into play.
See note 96 supra and accompanying text. Since there is not clear intent on the part of
Congress to apply the Act to foreigners working abroad for American companies, the Labor
Management Relations Act cannot be given such extraterritorial scope. Cf. Foley Bros.,
Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
176. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 112 and 113 supra and accompanying text.
178. See notes 165 and 166 supra and accompanying text.
179. See notes 112 and 113 supra and accompanying text.
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tion involving American employees who work on foreign soil for an
American MNC, both the home country and the host country can claim
contacts. Among the more important American contacts are the follow-
ing: (1) an American employer; (2) American employees; (3) the
bargaining relationship between two American parties (even though the
employees may be represented by a host country union); (4) the effect
of the relationship upon the American economy; and (5) the law of the
forum. Contacts with the foreign (host) country would include the loca-
tion of the bargaining relationship, the host country union, and the
effect of the American concern upon the host country's economy. De-
pending upon the facts of the particular situation, both the home coun-
try and the host country could claim contacts as a result of the situs or
impact of either party's use of economic weapons.
In light of the underlying purposes of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, the fact that the participants in the bargaining relationship
are American workers and employers means that the United States ipso
facto has substantial contacts. Moreover, the impact of the relationship
upon the American public provides measurable, if not substantial,
American contacts. Furthermore, since international law would not be
violated were the Labor Management Relations Act to be applied
against American employers and employees on foreign soil,'80 the foreign
situs of the bargaining relationship is not particularly important with
respect to foreign contacts. On the other hand, the impact of the foreign-
based bargaining relationship upon the foreign country's economy is
admittedly substantial. The American MNC must purchase materials
and sell final products, if not from and to the foreign (host) country,
then through its commercial channels. American employees, even spe-
cialists who do not replace foreign labor, still purchase foreign goods and
services with their earnings. Any picketing or strikes would most likely
take place in the host country or neighboring foreign countries where
the MNC has plants, rather than in the United States, and would spill
over into foreign concerns much more readily than into American con-
cerns.
In spite of these substantial foreign contacts, it is submitted that
American contacts, being more substantial, must prevail, and that the
Labor Management Relations Act must therefore apply.'"' Since both
180. See notes 36-71 supra and accompanying text.
181. Under a strict "contacts" approach, an American court would apply a domestic
statute to transnational facts regardless of the relative substantiality of foreign contacts,
so long as American contacts could be deemed substantial on an absolute scale. Cf. note
125 supra. Since the American contacts are more substantial here, however, the issue of
whether a strict contacts approach should be adhered to need not be decided.
[Vol. 10:1
The Labor Management Relations Act
host and home countries would have a substantial interest in the rela-
tionship, however, there is a real possibility that concurrent jurisdiction
would exist. 8' The problems inherent in concurrent jurisdiction provide
a possible reason for the United States to decline to assert jurisdiction. 'I
However, these problems do not affect the issue of jurisdiction vel non.
All of the cases in which the Supreme Court has utilized the govern-
mental interest technique of statutory analysis to determine the terri-
torial scope of the Labor Management Relations Act have involved
"false" conflicts.'84 Application of the Act to the various transnational
factual situations either would not have furthered the underlying poli-
cies of the Labor Management Relations Act while possibly disturbing
other countries' policies, or would not have disturbed other countries'
policies while furthering the underlying policies of the Act.' 5 In contrast,
the issue of whether the Labor Management Relations Act should apply
to American employees working on foreign soil for an American MNC
involves a "true" conflict.
The underlying purpose of the Labor Management Relations Act is
essentially to promote healthy collective bargaining relationships,
thereby producing desirable effects upon American workers, employers,
and society.'86 Without examining any specific foreign labor statute, it
is safe to assume that at least one of its underlying purposes would be
to further the interests of the foreign country's society and the workers
in that society. Given their respective purposes, a "true" conflict be-
tween the Labor Management Relations Act and foreign labor statutes
becomes readily apparent. The application of both the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act and the foreign labor statute to American employees
182. See notes 204-214 infra and accompanying text. The warning of Mr. Justice Jack-
son, in Lauritzen, is relevant here: "[Nior should we forget that any contact which we
hold sufficient to warrant application of our law to a foreign transaction will logically be
as strong a warrant for a foreign country to apply its law to an American transaction."
345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953). The application of foreign labor law to foreign employees working
in the United States for foreign companies is not particularly outrageous. The United
States could always exercise concurrent jurisdiction if American contacts warranted such
a course of action. The warning of Justice Jackson, however, becomes particularly poign-
ant when considering whether the LMRA, under the "contacts" approach, should apply
to foreign employees of an American corporation abroad. The United States would surely
protest if a foreign country applied their labor laws to American employees working in the
United States for a foreign company. Even under the Lauritzen approach, the Labor
Management Relations Act would probably not apply to foreign workers abroad, since
international law would be thereby violated. 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953). See note 51 supra.
183. See notes 204-214 infra and accompanying text.
184. See notes 123-128 supra and accompanying text.
185. See cases cited in note 86 supra.
186. See notes 163-166 supra and accompanying text.
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working on foreign soil for American corporations would further the
underlying purposes of the respective statutes.'87 Assuming that the in-
terests to be advanced by application of the forum's law would be sub-
stantial, the law of the forum applies when a true conflict exists under
the governmental interest technique.' s Accordingly, an American court
would have jurisdiction to apply the Labor Management Relations Act
to the transnational factual situation. 9 Again, since both the United
States and the foreign country would have a significant governmental
interest, the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction arises.'90 Since this
possibility and its corresponding problems do not affect the issue of
jurisdiction vel non, however, they are discussed subsequently.
IV
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
ACT
Having considered the applicability of American labor law to activi-
ties of MNCs carried on abroad, this article will now focus on the practi-
cal issues concerning such extraterritorial application. Particular atten-
tion will be accorded to whether and how cases and parties are brought
before the National Labor Relations Board and the courts for adjudica-
tion.
A. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
While there are a number of concepts embodied in the term "subject
matter jurisdiction," in the present context attention is accorded to the
basis upon which the Board and the courts may entertain the particular
matters which are sought to be litigated,
Unlike the situation in many countries, the system of labor-
management relations in the United States is highly developed and
187. See notes 171-175 supra and accompanying text.
188. See notes 122-125 supra and accompanying text.
189. Even assuming that a court had some basis for asserting jurisdiction, the Labor
Management Relations Act would not apply, under the governmental interest technique,
to foreign employees working for American MNCs on foreign soil. This situation involves
a "false" conflict in that application of the Labor Management Relations Act would not
further its underlying policies, since the Act is a "bill of rights ... for American working-
men and for their employers." Windward Shipping Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415
U.S. 104, 110 (1974), quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 144 (1957).
At the same time, the foreign country's policies would be infringed and international law
would probably be violated.
190. See note 204 infra and accompanying text.
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regulated by statute. As previously discussed, the core of this regulatory
scheme, the Labor Management Relations Act, declares that it is the
policy of the United States through the practice and procedure of collec-
tive bargaining to eliminate industrial strife and unrest which have the
effect of burdening and obstructing the free flow of commerce to and
from the United States.'"' The Act further empowers the National Labor
Relations Board to adopt such rules and regulations as are necessary to
carry out this purpose and policy and to prevent any person from engag-
ing in practices contrary to such policy which affect interstate and for-
eign commerce.
Under the "affecting commerce" test,'9 2 with relation to a labor dis-
pute, the duties and activities of the employees are not controlling in
jurisdictional terms. Since the employer's activities are solely determi-
native of jurisdiction under the Labor Management Relations Act, a
specific employee may come within the protection or under the proscrip-
tion of the Act even though he himself is not engaged in interstate
activity or in the production of goods for interstate sale. The test of the
Board's jurisdiction is the effect of the employer's activities upon com-
merce; that is, whether the obstruction of the employer's operations by
a labor dispute would affect commerce.
A series of cases beginning with Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo'93
examined the question of labor disputes in the maritime trade and
concluded that a necessary predicate for the exercise of Board jurisdic-
tion over an unfair labor practice in connection with a labor dispute is
that the practice must "affect commerce." In all of these cases, the
Supreme Court decided that the activities involved did in fact meet this
criterion.'94 Nevertheless, the exercise of jurisdiction was declined since
191. See note 165 supra. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), predecessor to the
Labor Management Relations Act, in Section 1 also declares that it is the policy of the
United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow
of commerce by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining. The
NLRA was upheld as a proper exercise of the power of Congress to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce under the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
192. See notes 140-142 supra and accompanying text. See also Herbert Harvey, Inc. v.
NLRB, 424 F.2d 770, 773 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
193. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
194. See, e.g., Windward Shipping Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104, 112-
13 (1973), in which the Supreme Court stated:
The term "in commerce," as used in the LMRA, is obviously not self-defining,
and certainly the activities in Benz, McCulloch, and Incres, held not covered by
the Act, were literally just as much "in commerce" as where the activities held
covered in Ariadne. Those cases which deny jurisdiction to the NLRB recognize
that Congress, when it used the words "in commerce" in the LMRA, simply did
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Congress "simply did not intend that Act to erase long-standing princi-
ples of comity and accommodation in international maritime trade."'l
Thus, a potential conflict with international law rather than any lack
of effect on commerce convinced the Court that the Board lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the interpretation given to
these cases, the Court's holdings can be cited for the proposition that
the Board did have subject matter jurisdiction, even though it did not
exercise such jurisdiction. "'
As expressed in Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,"17 the Board "has
traditionally reserved a discretion to decline jurisdiction in particular
cases where it believes the policies of the Act will not be effectuated by
an exercise of its authority.""18 The extent to which the Board chooses
to exercise its statutory jurisdiction "is a matter of administrative policy
within the Board's discretion and in the absence of extraordinary cir-
cumstances whether jurisdiction should be exercised is for the Board,
not the courts, to determine."' 99 In Herbert Harvey, the Board, echoing
not intend that Act to erase long-standing principles of comity and accommoda-
tion in international maritime trade (emphasis added).
195. Id. The Court also stated:
Recognition of the clear congressional purpose to apply the LMRA only to
American workers and employers was doubtless a sufficient reason to place the
picketing in Benz outside the Act. But the Court in that case made clear its
reluctance to intrude domestic labor law willy-nilly into the complex of considera-
tions affecting foreign trade, absent a clear congressional mandate to do so.
Id. at 110.
196. The Board has adopted "jurisdictional yardsticks" to determine whether or not
it will take jurisdiction in a particular case. The yardsticks, which apply in both represen-
tation and unfair labor practice cases, fix jurisdiction on the basis of the annual dollar
volume of interstate business done by the employer. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Bd., 353 U.S. 13-14 (1957). In 1959, however, after the decisions in Office Employees Union
v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957), and Hotel Employees Local No. 255 v. Leedom, 358 U.S.
99 (1958), Congress added to the Act Section 14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1964),
providing:
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules
adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdic-
tion over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where,
in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not
sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That
the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which
it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
197. 424 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
198. Id. at 773-74. See also Contract Serv., Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 862 (1973), where the
Board ruled that while it had the power to assert jurisdiction over the operations of
American employees in the Canal Zone, it chose not to do so for fear of adversely affecting
American-Panamanian relations.
199. NLRB v. WGOK, 384 F.2d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 1967); Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB,
424 F.2d 770, 783 n.94 (D.C.Cir. 1969).
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the Supreme Court in Benz ' and McCulloch,"0 ' exercised its discretion
and declined jurisdiction over the World Bank because it felt that to do
otherwise would infringe on the delicate field of international rela-
tions. 0
It is entirely possible then that the Board would decline to exercise
jurisdiction over the American employees of an MNC operating abroad
on the basis of its belief that to do otherwise would not effectuate the
Act's policies.
0 3
B. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
In Lauritzen,' the Supreme Court warned that any contact which the
United States holds sufficient to warrant application of American do-
200. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
201. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
202. Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 770, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1969); See also Von
Solbrig Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB, 465 F.2d 173, 174 (7th Cir. 1972); Contract Serv., Inc.,
202 N.L.R.B. 862 (1973).
203. Since the exercise of jurisdiction would require the Board to assert authority over
a foreign union located abroad, it may believe such action would infringe on the "delicate
field of international relations." However, the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign union
would be no more offensive than a host country's exercise of labor relations jurisdiction
over an American MNC and its American employees. The Supreme Court, moreover, in
both Ariadne and Windward Shipping saw no problem with the fact that the crews of the
vessels were represented by foreign unions. Nationality, however, has not in the past been
the principal factor in the Board's decision to assert or decline jurisdiction. The Board
has ordered elections and restrained unfair labor practices of businesses owned by foreign
nations in the United States. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 118 N.L.R.B. 1327
(1957); Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione, 118 N.L.R.B. 1113 (1957); Delta Match
Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1400, 1401 n.2 (1953); The Royal Bank of Canada, 67 N.L.R.B. 403
(1946). See Currie, supra note 74, at 80-81, where the following example is given: An
American plant in Pakistan bears a much more intimate relationship to the Pakistani
than to the American economy, and the application of American labor law to the employ-
ees would run a substantial risk of offense to foreign sovereignty. See 1 CCH LAB. L. REP.
T 1610 (1962). But Currie's argument relates to the application of American labor law to
all of the plant's employees, not just to the American employees. The fact that, in terms
of representation, the employees will be "bifurcated" should not deter the Board from
exercising jurisdiction. The fact that some employees of a company are represented by one
union while others are represented by another union or are not represented at all has not
troubled the Board in the United States. Neither has the fact that these employees receive
different wages or operate under different working conditions, for this is the collective
bargaining process. Nor should the fact that American employees are regulated by foreign
law be a major deterrent. The only serious problem which bifurcation may present is in
any possible attempt by an MNC to forestall coordinated economic action by the bifur-
cated groups. Practically, how does the MNC apply two sets of national laws to one
coordinated group of employees on a picket line? This is a particularly thorny problem if
the national laws are divergent in legal effect and application.
204. 345 U.S. 571, 583 (1953).
1976]
Cornell International Law Journal
mestic law to a foreign transaction will logically be as strong a warrant
for a foreign country to apply its law to an American transaction. Since
beyond a certain point, contacts, occurrences, and effects in a transna-
tional setting involve a foreign jurisdiction as much as they do the
United States, it is not improbable that a situation will arise in which
both the home country and host country have concurrent jurisdiction
over the matter. For example, the application by foreign countries of
their labor law to foreign employees working in the United States for
foreign companies is certainly within reason. As a result, the Supreme
Court's warning in McCulloch that American extraterritorial action
may invoke retaliations from other nations can not be ignored."'
Of course, the possibility of retaliation is not the only factor which
may influence the United States to decline to exercise jurisdiction over
MNCs abroad. A state may have deep-rooted local policies, customs, or
practices which it feels are sufficiently important to require MNCs to
abide by local rather than home country laws.' Labor relations laws,
where they exist, are usually based on historical, political and social
factors peculiar to the country involved. 7 As previously mentioned,
there are also national policy reasons for self-imposed limitations.0 '
205. 372 U.S. 10, 21. See also Craig, supra note 170, at 597, which states that American
extraterritorial regulation may even encourage foreign states to hold the American parent
responsible for the acts of its subsidiary, applying in reverse the precedent of American
regulation. Some host countries might attempt to regulate the activities of the parent
corporation in response to United States regulation of the subsidiary. Currie, supra note
74, at 80 n.83, states that it has been argued the United States would object to an attempt
by a foreign government to apply its labor laws here. This does not mean, however, that
every assertion of American jurisdiction over Americans in foreign countries is.a cause for
retaliation. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1931).
206. Raymond, The Exercise of Concurrent International Jurisdiction: Move with Cir-
cumspection Appropriate, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 673, 673-77 (1967).
207. MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 7, at 103.
208. The Comment to Section 37 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965), says: "In most situations international law does
not provide rules for a choice among the different bases of jurisdiction that international
law recognizes. If a state has a basis of jurisdiction that is recognized under international
law, it may generally exercise its jurisdiction even though another state may also have a
recognized basis of jurisdiction." However, Section 40 states that: "where two states have
jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they may prescribe require
inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required by international law
to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the
light of such factors as (a) vital national interests of each of the states, (b) the extent and
the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the
person, (c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of
the other state, (d) the nationality of the person, and (e) the extent to which enforcement
by action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule
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It is no answer to the problem of concurrent jurisdiction to apply the
laws of both countries, for in many situations this is impossible as the
labor statutes conflict."' Obviously, conflicting labor statutes can not
simultaneously function effectively with respect to the same persons or
same occurrence.2 10 While the solution is to have one country's laws defer
to the application of the other, the question is which country, in light
of the policies that are relevant, should yield in the interest of applying
a unitary law. Consequently, the issue involved is not of the power of a
domestic court to exercise jurisdiction, but rather of the propriety of its
doing so. The question of propriety is, of course, a conflict of laws ques-
tion.
American courts confronted with actions based upon an application
or nonapplication of American laws, have sometimes examined the
claims of the various nations interested in the transaction."' In the
prescribed by that state." The policy interests which may require limitations on the
exercise of jurisdiction include:
(a) Comity-See United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp.
504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
(b) Nationality of the parties-See United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland
Information Center, 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
(c) Conflict with foreign law-See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 340 U.S. 280 (1953);
Whitney, Sources of Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE
L.J. 655 (1954).
209. See generally Seham, supra note 11, at 358-59; MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra
note 7, at 100-04; Fairweather, supra note 32, at 106; Note, National Labor Unions v.
Multinational Companies, The Dilemma of Unequal Bargaining Power, 11 COLUM J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 124, 127-46 (1972).
210. This relates also to the discretionary jurisdiction of the Board. In McCulloch, the
Court held that because the simultaneous application of both American and Honduran
law would create a chaotic situation, the Board must decline jurisdiction. 372 U.S. at 21-
22.
211. Foreseeing such conflicts, American courts at times have been careful to avoid
them. For example, in United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953),
implementing the decision in 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), the court enjoined Philips, a
Dutch firm, from contracting to refrain from exporting lamps and other goods to the
United States or producing them there, but qualified the injunction by providing that:
Philips shall not be in contempt of this Judgment for doing anything outside of
the United States which is required or for not doing anything outside of the United
States which is unlawful under the laws of the government, province, country or
state in which Philips or any other subsidiaries may be incorporated, chartered
or organized or in the territory of which Philips or any such subsidiaries may be
doing business.
115 F. Supp at 878.
In United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 133 F. Supp. 40
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), the Government alleged a conspiracy of Swiss and American manufac-
turers and sellers of watches and watch parts, chiefly on the basis of acts done in Switzer-
land, which the court found affected the commerce of the United States. The court
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Jones Act cases, 12 the Supreme Court balanced the relevant contacts
of the nations concerned. Thus, a court, confronted with the issue of the
extraterritorial application of the Labor Management Relations Act,
may attempt to divide or award jurisdiction between the nations in-
volved in a manner adequate to safeguard their respective interests .2
Consequently, if an examination of the statutory policies at issue is used
to resolve conflicts, the application of the Labor Management Relations
Act may be circumvented even though in a technical sense it may
lawfully be applied extraterritorially.211
C. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Whenever an action is brought under the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act before the Board or a court, the authority involved must have
power to bind the parties personally to obedience. This raises the ques-
tion of when and how personal jurisdiction may be obtained over the
parties. Personal jurisdiction is not obtained merely because a party's
determined that the defendants' combination and conspiracy was directed towards United
States trade and commerce, and many of the acts of defendants in furtherance of the
conspiracy took place in the United States. It further found that the agreements and acts
were not required by any Swiss law, statute, decree or ordinance in effect in Switzerland.
The defendants argued that the court should not assume jurisdiction over their activities
because American antitrust laws could not be applied to acts of sovereign governments.
After final judgment, the United States moved to modify the judgment so as to avoid
possible conflict with Swiss law. Granting specific modifications, the court said that they
would prevent any situation from arising such as had occurred in the past when there was
believed to be a possible conflict between a decree of a United States court and the
sovereignty of a foreign nation. The modifications related to peripheral areas of the judg-
ment which may have been construed as bearing upon the sovereignty of the Swiss Con-
federation.
212. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Romero v. International Terminal Oper-
ating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
213. For example, under general conflict of law rules, the internal affairs of a corpora-
tion (like those of a ship) are governed by the law of its place of incorporation (registry).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 303-310 (1969). However, the artificiality
of a corporate domicile has been recognized for some time, e.g., Delaware incorporation.
On the other hand, the realities of foreign-state incorporation have been recognized by
Congress in limiting a corporation's access to the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts
by deeming it a citizen of its principal place of business as well as of its place of incorpora-
tion. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970). Further, if foreign incorporation or registry are a facade
when used by American owners to avoid responsibility under the Jones Act, they are the
same when used to avoid responsibilities to labor. Currie, supra note 74, at 76. Thus, the
conflicts concept of corporate domicile is about as sacred as the corporate personality. Id.
at 86. Thus, where a state's interests are affected, it may apply its own law to a corpora-
tion it considers its own despite its foreign incorporation. See generally Jones, supra note
72.
214. See text, part Ill(B)(3) supra.
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conduct has allegedly violated our labor laws. Traditionally, notions of
personal jurisdiction are based on a party's presence within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of a particular court. 1 5 However, the current view as
expressed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington21 1 is that the defen-
dant must have sufficient contacts with the forum so that maintenance
of a suit against him in that jurisdiction does not offend notions of fair
play and substantial justice. With respect to the MNC and its American
employees, nationality has been held to be a sufficient contact to justify
the assertion by courts of personal jurisdiction, even though the MNC
and its employees are located outside the country.
217
However, there may be a problem with respect to personal jurisdiction
if a foreign union which represents the American employees is named
as the defendant, unless it gives its consent to jurisdiction or waives any
objection thereto.2 1 1 A foreign union, like a foreign company, may have
sufficient minimum contacts in the United States for jurisdictional pur-
poses, 215 and such minimum contacts may be based upon its relationship
with an affiliated American international union as its agent.20 Further-
more, even though the traditional requirement of minimum contacts
must be established by activity within the forum, the case of
Scriptomatic, Inc. v. Agfa-Gevaert, Inc. 21 held that personal jurisdic-
tion may be based on the mere fact of "causing an effect in the state by
an act done elsewhere." This, of course, is an extension of the doctrines
set forth in Alcoa and the RESTATEMENT.2 2 However, personal jurisdic-
tion based on effects suffers from the same infirmity as subject matter
jurisdiction based on effects. Since reliance therefore should not be
placed on this theory to establish personal jurisdiction over an otherwise
absent defendant with no "activity" type contacts in the forum, the
requirement of personal jurisdiction may deter legal action.
D. VENUE
Unlike jurisdiction, venue does not relate to the inherent power of a
court to hear a case. Rather, it relates only to the proper geographic
location in which judicial authority may be exercised. Objections to
215. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1969).
216. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
217. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
218. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).
219. See Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo, S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
220. Id.
221. 1973-1 TRADE CAS. 74,594 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
222. See note 51 supra.
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venue are waived unless seasonably made and a party may consent to
be sued in a district that would otherwise be an improper venue. ',
Naturally, the district in which the plaintiff resides or transacts busi-
ness may be the most convenient forum for it to initiate an action, but
the general venue laws attempt to strike a fair balance between the
competing interests of the parties. 24 For example, if jurisdiction is
founded solely upon diversity of citizenship, the case may be brought
only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or'all defendants reside
or in which the claim arose." However, where jurisdiction .is founded
on an overseas violation of federal labor laws by a foreign union rather
than on diversity grounds, the above principle is inapplicable. 26 The
federal venue statute provides, however, that a defendant alien may be
sued in any district, in which case such defendant has no protection
against an inconvenient suit.12 In considering this provision in Brunette
Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc.,211 the Supreme Court
affirmed the principle that the general venue laws will not govern a suit
against a foreign defendant. Consequently, it appears that once personal
jurisdiction over the foreign defendant is secured, the federal venue
provisions will not create a further legal impediment to the extraterrito-
rial application of the Labor Management Relations Act.
E. SERVICE OF PROCESS
In actions involving the application of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act abroad, extraterritorial service of process may be required
unless the defendant, or an agent thereof, resides in the district where
the court sits. In either case, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which governs service of process in all civil suits in American
federal district courts, provides that service may be effected under an
applicable federal statute or under a long-arm statute. In addition, the
Rule prescribes the procedure for service found in the foreign country.
Section 10 of the Labor Management Relations Act deals in part with
223. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
224. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1970).
225. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1970).
226. Also inapplicable would be subsections (b), where jurisdiction is not founded solely
on diversity of citizenship, venue lies in the judicial district where all defendants reside
or where the claim arose, and (c), where a corporation can be sued in the judicial district
where it is incorporated, licensed to do business or is doing business.
227. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1970).
228. 406 U.S. 706 (1970). See also Vergarra v. Aeroflot "Soviet Airlines," 390 F. Supp.
1266 (D. Neb. 1975); SCM Corp. v. Brother Int'l Corp. 316 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo, S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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the service of process." This Section empowers the Board: to issue and
serve a complaint upon persons engaging in unfair labor practices; to
petition a federal court of appeals or district court, within any circuit
or district, to enforce a Board order and have such court cause notice of
the filing of the petition to be served; and to petition any district court
for appropriate temporary relief, injunctive relief, or restraining order
and cause notice thereof to be served. In Section 11, the Act also stipu-
lates that all process of any court, to which application may be made
under the Act, may be served in the judicial district where the defendant
required to be served resides or may be found."' The statute further
provides that service of legal process on an officer or agent of a labor
organization shall constitute service upon the labor organization itself,
thereby making it a party to the suit.2'
Cumulatively, these provisions assure that there are no practical terri-
torial limits on service of process. Even if the foreign defendant has no
agents which may be served within the United States, Rule 4(i) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides five ample means by which
parties may be served with process in foreign countries.2 32 As a result,
service of process will also not create a substantial hindrance to the
extraterritorial application of the Labor Management Relations Act.
229. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
230. 29 U.S.C. § 161(5) (1970). Section 10 states in a proviso:
Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection district courts shall be
deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which
such organization maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its
duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in promoting or protecting the
interests of employee members.
29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970).
231. 29 U.S.C. § 185(d) (1970).
232. FED R. Civ. P. 4(i) provides the following five alternative manners of service in the
foreign country:
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that
country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or
(B) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory, when service
[in the case of either (A) or (B)] is reasonably calculated to give actual notice [a "letter
rogatory" is a formal letter from the domestic court to the appropriate court of the foreign
country requesting its aid in making service]; or
(C) upon an individual, by delivery to him personally, and upon a corporation or
partnership or association, by delivery to an officer, a managing or general agent; or
(D) by any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched
by the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or
(E) as directed by order of the court.
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F. DISCOVERY AND INVESTIGATION
Under the Labor Management Relations Act, extensive supervision
and investigation is required for the prevention of unfair labor practices,
the direction of elections, and the assurance of good faith negotiations
and collective bargaining. For example, the Board must determine ap-
propriate units, hold elections, regulate "good faith" collective bargain-
ing, investigate unfair labor practice charges, issue charges and exercise
other supervision and investigation over employers, employees and un-
ions within its coverage.133 While the Board is given broad investigatory
and discovery powers for the purpose of fulfilling its duties, there is no
case law or authority dealing with the power of the Board to conduct
investigation and discovery proceedings abroad. Furthermore, the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide methods of discovery for
obtaining information located abroad, do not apply to administrative
proceedings such as those conducted by the Board.
In addition, while the Board has power to issue subpoenas to require
the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence, such au-
thority extends only to "any place in the United States."' If applied
literally, this provision would constitute a serious limitation on the exer-
cise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Finally, even if discovery of documents located abroad was permissi-
ble under federal law, foreign countries, believing the exertion of discov-
ery power by American courts exceeded the bounds imposed by princi-
ples of international law, may not allow their nationals to produce such
documents.2 31 Under these circumstances, foreign jurisdictions may
frustrate the extraterritorial application of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act even when the American court maintains personal jurisdic-
tion over the foreign defendant.
233. See NLRB Rules and Regulations, Series 8, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.9-102.51, 102.60-
102.80 (1971); NLRB Statements of Procedure, Series 8,29 C.F.R. §§ 101.2-101.12, 101.17-
101.21 (1971).
234. 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1970).
235. As a result of chauvinistic decrees entered by American courts against foreign firms
allegedly engaged in antitrust conspiracies, two Canadian jurisdictions passed laws pre-
venting discovery actions instigated in United States courts. In addition, Great Britain
refused to enforce and the Netherlands protested the enforcement of decrees that prohib-
ited conduct specifically permitted by their laws. These countries are by no means unique.
See generally A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 360-72
(2d ed. 1970); Fulgate, An Overview of Antitrust Enforcement and the Multinational
Corporation, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1973). See also United States v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
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G. ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
The extraterritorial application of the Labor Management Relations
Act maintains some degree of significance only if methods exist to en-
force judgments rendered pursuant to the terms of the Act. In the do-
mestic setting, several methods are generally used to require compliance
by defendants with judgments against them, i.e. attachment, garnish-
ment, and contempt. In fact, the courts use the contempt power to
enforce Board relief and decisions. However, although in Section 10(e)
of the Labor Management Relations Act the Board has the power to
petition any federal court of appeals for the enforcement of its orders,,"
this power is irrelevant if the defendant involved is a foreign national
residing abroad.
If a foreign defendant is involved, the United States Constitution
offers no assistance to the plaintiff who secures judgment in this country
and attempts to enforce such judgment by an action in another country.
Rather, the plaintiff must rely on the concept of reciprocity wherein
such foreign country will accord an American judgment effect if the
United States would enforce the foreign country's judgments in a simi-
liar situation.
Presently, the great majority of the nations act in accordance with the
reciprocity rule.237 However, the rule creates numerous problems for
those seeking to enforce American judgments abroad. Generally, the
courts in foreign countries have had difficulty weaving their way
through the tangled and confusing web of federal and state decisions
in the United States in trying to determine what effect the United
States gives to their nations' judgments.23 As a result, although
American courts have tended to grant conclusive effect to foreign judg-
ments, the same treatment has not always been granted in return.2 39 On
the whole, except where a specific treaty or convention exists between
the United States and the foreign country, enforcement of American
judgments abroad tends to be difficult and largely impractical.2 0
Furthermore, countries which generally abide by reciprocity princi-
ples frequently refuse to enforce foreign judgments that are either penal
in nature or contrary to the public policy of the forum court, " and
American labor relations judgments may often be viewed as falling
236. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
237. E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER 62-63 (1974).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. Of course, there is a possibility that the provisions of some FCN treaties will
provide for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
241. Id.
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within this latter category. Similarly, some countries display a hesi-
tancy to enforce judgments which promote the economic policies of a
foreign legislator.2 42 As a consequence of these disparate attitudes of
foreign courts, it may be impossible to establish a uniform, enforceable
policy of American labor relations abroad with respect to multinational
corporations even if the Labor Management Relations Act is accorded
extraterritorial application by the United States.
CONCLUSION
From the analysis, it is evident that principles of international law do
not operate as direct constraints upon the extraterritorial application of
the Labor Management Relations Act to American employees working
on foreign soil for American multinational corporations. Furthermore,
under the three primary methods of statutory analysis, one may infer
that Congress intended that the Act receive such an application. How-
ever, due to the inherent nature of the international setting, practical
obstacles, both legal and political, may preclude the furtherance of the
underlying policies of the Act despite its extraterritorial application.
Conflicting national conceptions of jurisdiction and the proper scope of
discovery proceedings may undermine the prevention of unfair labor
practices and impair the supervision of union elections conducted
abroad. Furthermore, since the extraterritorial recognition of judgments
is dependent primarily upon principles of sovereignty, comity and reci-
procity, it seems unlikely that one could establish a uniform and en-
forceable American labor policy governing multinational corporations
and their employees abroad through the mere extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Labor Management Relations Act.
242. Id.
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